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INTRODUCTION 
 
 It is now commonplace to see nonprofit1 organizations active during political 
campaigns.  Churches invite candidates to give sermons on the eve of an election.2  
Charities and other nonprofits fund politically charged issue ads3 and, in certain 
circumstances, register and mobilize voters.4  And nonprofits other than charities set 
up political action committees (“PACs”) to support the candidacy of specific 
individuals running for election to public office.5 
 Most of these and similar activities are regulated by the Internal Revenue 
Code (the “Code”).6  If the nonprofit is exempt from federal income tax as a charity 
                                                 
 1 Throughout this Article, I use the term “nonprofits” as a shorthand for “exempt 
organizations,” i.e., nonprofit groups exempt from federal income tax under section 
501 of the Internal Revenue Code.  Technically speaking, however, groups obtain 
“nonprofit” status under state law, and not all state law nonprofits qualify as exempt 
organizations under federal tax law.  
2  See Dan Gilgoff, Editorial, Turning a Blind Eye, IRS Enables Church Politicking, 
USA Today, January 29, 2007, at A13 (“most of us have become familiar with the 
sight of Democratic candidates addressing liberal African-American congregations 
from the pulpit”); Wayne Slater, Invisible Force Helping Huckabee: Largely Unknown 
Christian Leaders Prove Powerful in Iowa, Dallas Morning News, Dec. 24, 2007, at 
A1 (discussing the role sermons played in Mike Huckabee’s campaign); Patrick L. 
O’Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical Perspective of the Permeable 
IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C.L. REV. 733, 736-39 (2001) 
(describing church activities during the 2000 presidential election). 
 3  Michael Riley, Political Funds Skirt Rules as Regulators Clamp Down on 527 
Groups, Other Nonprofits Draw Donor Ads, Denver Post, Dec. 11, 2007, at B1 
(discussing increases in funds for nonprofits to run “grassroots issues” ads due to 
restrictions on other organizations). 
4  See e.g. Lynn Brezosky, Valley is Relatively Quiet About Election, San Antonio 
Express-News, November 3, 2008, at A8 (mentioning get-out-the-vote efforts by a 
group of six nonprofits).  As is described below, detailed tax and campaign finance 
rules determine whether and how a particular nonprofit can engage in voter 
mobilization. 
 5For example, there is MoveOn.org Civic Action, which is a section 501(c)(4) 
organization, and MoveOn.org Political Action, which is its affiliated PAC, see 
http://www.moveon.org/about.html (last visited May 13, 2009); US Chamber of 
Commerce, a section 501(c)(6) organization, see http://www.uschamber.com, and US 
Chamber of Commerce PAC (NPAC), see http://herndon1.sdrdc.com/cgi-
bin/fecimg/?C00082040 (last visited October 20, 2009).  See also I.R.C. § 527(f); 
Senate Report No. 93-1357, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (Dec. 16, 1974) (authorizing 
501(c) groups to establish a connected PAC). 
 6   All references to the Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.  
Throughout this article, references to “tax law” refer to the federal income tax 
provisions in the Code and the associated regulations and administrative materials, 
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described in section 501(c)(3), it is barred from intervening in political campaigns.7  
Nonprofits described in other subsections of 501(c)–such as 501(c)(4) or 501(c)(6)--
are generally permitted to intervene in campaigns, but the importance of their 
campaign activity relative to the activities fulfilling their exempt mission is 
restricted.8 
 In many instances, the campaign activities of nonprofit organizations are also 
subject to regulation by the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”).9 The 
provisions of each of these two statutory regimes10–the Code and FECA--are very 
different, so that a specific campaign related activity engaged in by a nonprofit may 
be subject to campaign finance restrictions under FECA, but not subject to tax law 
restrictions under the Code, or the reverse.  Alternatively, both statutes may regulate 
the scope or manner of a specific campaign related activity, but to different degrees 
or in different ways.  Ultimately these differences can be traced to the fact that the 
two statutory regimes have been enacted to further distinct public purposes.  That the 
two regimes are administered and enforced by different agencies, with differing 
missions, powers, and histories creates an additional layer of complexity.  
 Recent developments in campaign finance law have called into question the 
validity of the tax law restrictions on political campaign activity.  In 2007, in Federal 
Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life,11 the Supreme Court held that the 
First Amendment severely restricted the ability of Congress to use campaign finance 
law to regulate a particular type of political speech on the eve of a primary or an 
election.12  In 2010, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,13 the Court 
went further and ruled that the prohibition in FECA against corporations engaging in 
campaign activity using their general treasury funds was unconstitutional because it 
banned protected political speech based upon the identity of the speaker.  In both 
decisions, the Court articulated a First Amendment standard totally at odds with the 
First Amendment standard currently employed in the tax law area.  
                                                                                                                                           
unless otherwise noted.  
 7  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
 8  See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. 
 9  See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et. seq. (2000).  
Throughout this article, references to  “campaign finance law” refer to this Act and the 
associated regulations and administrative materials, unless otherwise noted. 
 10  In this Article, the phrase “statutory regime” includes the rules created by the 
statute combined with the implementing regulations and administrative decisions and 
pronouncements, as these have been interpreted by the relevant agencies and the 
courts. 
 11  551 U.S. 449, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (“WRTL”).  Because there was a Supreme 
Court decision a year earlier involving the same advertisements, some commentators 
refer to the 2007 decision as “WRTL II.” 
 12  See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. 
 13  558 U.S. ___, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 766 (2010). 
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 These two recent campaign finance cases thus raise questions about the 
constitutionality of the federal tax law regulation of political campaign activities.  
The constitutionality of the tax restrictions on political activity was addressed only 
once before 2009. In Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, a decision involving a church that 
placed political ads in two national newspapers before the 1992 presidential election, 
the court upheld the tax law political intervention prohibition for 501(c)(3) 
organizations in the face of both free speech and free exercise challenges.14  In 2009, 
two lawsuits were filed challenging, inter alia, the constitutionality of the tax law 
restrictions as they apply to a 501(c)(3) organization and a 501(c)(4) group.15  Both 
complaints rely in part on the First Amendment standard announced in the campaign 
finance context in Wisconsin Right to Life.16 
  It is thus likely that in the next few years, the Supreme Court will address the 
constitutionality of the tax law restrictions on campaign activity, which often impose 
more severe limitations on campaign activity than is permitted under campaign 
finance law.  This Article examines whether constitutional law doctrine developed in 
response to campaign finance restrictions on political speech must be applied to the 
parallel restrictions on the same type of speech imposed by tax law. The Article 
focuses on the prohibition preventing section 501(c)(3) organizations from political 
campaign activity, although much of the analysis would also apply to the less 
restrictive limitations on the campaign activities of other groups described in section 
501(c).  I conclude that importing the campaign finance First Amendment standard 
into tax law First Amendment jurisprudence is not required as a matter of 
constitutional law because the constitutional principles underlying the two spheres 
are fundamentally different, permitting more intrusive regulation by the tax Code 
than by FECA. 
 Parts I-III discuss three critical areas in which the campaign finance regime 
and the federal tax regime can produce inconsistent results for nonprofits active 
                                                 
 14  Branch Ministries et al. v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000) and infra notes 
143 and 162 and accompanying text. For the free exercise claim, see id. at 142-43; for 
the free speech claim, see id. at 143-44.  See also Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 
40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 26-27.  The Supreme Court upheld the arguably parallel tax law 
restrictions on lobbying by charities in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of 
Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (“TWR”). 
 15  See Christian Coalition of Florida, Inc. v. United States, US District Court, Middle 
District of Florida, Ocala Division, Civil Action No. 5:09-cv-00144-WTH-GRJ (the 
501(c)(4) case); Catholic Answers, Inc. and Karl Keating v. United States, U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of California, Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-00670-
IEG-AJB (the 501(c)(3) case).  Both of these complaints also rely upon Big Mama 
Rag, Inc. v. U.S., 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  For the trial court decision, see  
Catholic Answers v. U.S., 2009-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶50,697, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 
(RIA) 6894 (S.D. Cal. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-56926 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2009). 
 16  Complaint, Christian Coalition of Florida, at ¶ 64; Complaint, Catholic Answers, 
at  ¶ 31.   
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during political campaigns: (1) the categories of election-related activity that may be 
restricted, (2) the proper method for agencies to use to determine if a group’s 
activities have in fact violated a valid legal restriction, and (3) the level of scrutiny a 
court will employ to determine if a restriction violates constitutional norms.  These 
three issues were central to the reasoning in Wisconsin Right to Life and Citizens 
United, and they will undoubtedly provide the framework for determining the 
constitutionality of the restrictions on political campaign activity contained in the tax 
law.   
 Part IV analyzes how the doctrines of traditional tax jurisprudence discussed 
in Parts I-III are likely to be applied to the political prohibition preventing 501(c)(3) 
organizations from participating in political campaigns.  It concludes that under 
existing tax law jurisprudence, which the campaign finance cases are unlikely to alter, 
the impact of the political prohibition will not be deemed a burden as a matter of 
constitutional law. This is the case even if the organizations in question might suffer 
economically from a loss of revenues if they were to forgo tax exemption in order to 
be involved in political campaigns. Part IV then analyzes the political prohibition in 
light of the rational relation test and concludes that theprohibition’s purpose and the 
means chosen to achieve that purpose are likely to pass constitutional muster.   
 The last section of Part IV examines the possibility that the political 
prohibition may be deemed unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because of the lack 
of precision in the terms of the prohibition and the authorities elaborating their 
meaning.  It concludes that the Supreme Court might assess these questions using a 
form of heightened scrutiny and that the outcome, in such an event, is less certain than 
the outcome of the previous inquiry.  Thus, although it seems that the balance of 
authorities favor upholding the political prohibition in the tax law despite the dramatic 
changes made by the recent campaign finance cases, some ambiguity remains as to 
the constitutional validity of the political prohibition in the tax law as it is currently 
interpreted. 
 
I.  THE COMPETING REGIMES: CATEGORIES OF ELECTION 
RELATED ACTIVITY SUBJECT TO GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
 
 A. The Expansive Tax Law Approach 
 
 Since 1954, the Internal Revenue Code has prohibited charities17 from 
participating or intervening in political campaigns.18  The implementing Treasury 
regulations add that the prohibition applies to indirect as well as direct political 
                                                 
 17  “Charities” is shorthand for organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the 
Code and exempt from federal income tax because of their educational, religious, 
scientific, etc., activities.   
 18  See I.R.C.§ 501(c)(3). 
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participation.19  The statute specifically states that publishing and distributing 
statements count as intervention and that activity taken in opposition to a candidate 
counts to the same degree as activity in support of a candidate.20  The prohibition was 
added to the description of charitable entities in 1954 as a result of a floor amendment 
proposed by then Senator Lyndon Johnson, but the legislative history is silent as to 
the reason for or scope of the provision.21 
 In contrast to charities, organizations described in other subsections of section 
501(c) are permitted to participate or intervene in political campaigns.  These include 
social welfare and civic organizations described in section 501(c)(4), labor 
organizations described in section 501(c)(5), and trade associations described in 
section 501(c)(6).22  However, such organizations must be primarily engaged in 
promoting the mission that is the basis of their respective exemptions.  Campaign 
activities are not considered to promote an exempt purpose for any of the subsections 
of section 501(c).23  Thus, 501(c) organizations other than charities are permitted to 
engage in campaign activities, but if these become extensive enough, they can 
undermine an organization’s claim to be devoted primarily to its exempt purpose.  
                                                 
 19  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(ii), -1(c)(3)(iii) (2008).  
 20  I.R.C.§ 501(c)(3).  Until 1987, the statute did not contain the parenthetical “or in 
opposition to.”   See Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-464, §19711.  However, 
campaign activity was always understood to include both support and opposition to a 
candidate for public office. 
 21  See H.R. 7835, 73rd Cong. (1934), §§ 101(6), 406; Marie B. Morris & Thomas B. 
Ripy, Limits on Lobbying and Political Activity by Tax-Exempt Organizations: 
Historical Background and Continuing Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
REPORT 3 (March 10, 1987).  Only the lobbying limitation was enacted into law in 
1934. A provision limiting charities’ participation  in “partisan politics” was approved 
by the  Senate in 1934 at the same time as the counterpart provision limiting the extent 
of lobbying permitted to charities was enacted, but the political participation provision 
was not enacted into law, and it is unclear why the prohibition against engaging in 
partisan politics was dropped.  Both provisions may have been inspired by an earlier 
court decision stating that “political agitation” should not be paid for by “public 
subvention.”  Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930).  For theories regarding 
the origin of Johnson’s amendment, see Chris Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches and the IRS: 
Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145, 152-53 (2006); O’Daniel, supra note 2, at 746-67; Oliver A. 
Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral Politics under the 
Internal Revenue Code, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 23-29 (2003/04); Deirdre Halloran & 
Kevin Kearney, Federal Tax Code Restrictions on Church Political Activity, 38 CATH. 
LAW. 105, 106-08 (1998).  
 22  See IRS Fact Sheet 97-8, 1997 IRB LEXIS 85 (1997). 
 23  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36286 (May 22, 
1975); I.R.S. Fact Sheet 97-8, 1997 IRB LEXIS 85, Feb. 1997.  In contrast, campaign 
activities are the core of the exempt purpose of section 527 groups.  See I.R.C. § 
527(e). 
 
WHEN STATUTORY REGIMES COLLIDE        6  
Moreover, private benefit and certain commercial transactions, if any exist, must be 
aggregated with the group’s campaign intervention to determine if the group is 
organized and operating primarily for its exempt purpose.24  In addition to these 
limitations on the relationship between their campaign activity and their exempt 
purpose, such organizations may also be subject to a tax calculated using the dollar 
amount of their campaign expenditures as a base.25 
 Thus, all 501(c) exempt organizations are subject to restrictions on their 
campaign activity.  Because the Code and the implementing Treasury regulations do 
not elaborate which election related activities qualify as “participating or intervening 
in political campaigns,” the meaning of these terms must be derived from various 
Revenue Rulings, an assortment of other administrative pronouncements, and a few 
court cases.  These authorities elaborate an expansive view of the types of election 
related activity that may be subject to the tax law restrictions.  In addition to the 
obvious culprits, such as communicating or funding a message that expressly endorses 
a specific candidate or contributing to a candidate’s campaign, the Service also 
classifies as campaign intervention all activities that support or oppose a candidate for 
office or otherwise intervene in an election, indirectly as well as directly.  For 
example, the New York City Bar Association’s practice of rating candidates running 
for election as judge on a nonpartisan basis disqualified it from receiving exempt 
status as a 501(c)(3) organization.26  Despite the fact that the association often gave 
multiple competing candidates the same highest rating and political party played no 
                                                 
24 arily” standard is undefined and controversial.  When litigating against    The “prim
social welfare organizations, the I.R.S. has repeatedly argued that the primarily 
standard means that a group’s non-social welfare activities cannot be “substantial.” See 
Vision Services Plan v. U.S., 2006-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 50,173, aff’d 2008-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 
50,160, cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 898 (2009); Vision Service Plan, Inc. v. U.S., Brief for 
the United States in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiori, p. 8.  In other 
forums, the Service has  adopted less restrictive standards, e.g., that a social welfare 
organization is entitled to exemption even if 49% of its activities are not devoted to 
social welfare.  See, e.g., I.R.S. Fact Sheet 97-8, 1997 IRB Lexis 85, Feb. 1997; I.R.S. 
Gen. Couns. Mem. 34233 (Dec. 3, 1969); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36286, supra note 
23.  Whatever the standard, the IRS may measure more than the percentage of a 
group’s expenditures for election activities, as it does with the lobbying standard, 
which looks at the importance of lobbying for a group’s mission as well as to the 
amount of lobbying.  See Haswell v. U.S., 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 1107 (1975); Nationalist Movement v. Comm’r, 102 Tax Ct. 558, 589 (1994), 
affirmed on other grounds, 37 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1192 
(1995). 
 25  See I.R.C. §527(f)(1).  Section 527(f)(1) provides that the tax will be assessed on 
the lesser of the amount of a group’s campaign expenditures or its net investment 
income.  Groups with little net investment income will thus have relatively little tax 
exposure no matter how much they spend on campaign activities. 
 26  See Association of the Bar of the City of New York v. Commissioner, 858 F.2d 876 
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989). 
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role in its evaluations, the Service determined that the act of rating candidates for 
elective office constituted intervention in a political campaign.27   
 The IRS may find a public forum that includes all the candidates for a 
particular office28 nonpartisan and thus not subject to these restrictions. The forum 
may, however, be classified as campaign activity if the content of the questions, the 
format of the forum, or anything else appears to favor or disfavor one candidate in 
comparison to the others.29  Similarly, a 501(c)(3) organization may invite candidates 
to speak at group functions, but only if it invites competing candidates to functions of 
comparable importance to the host group.30  This limitation does not apply, however, 
if a candidate is invited to a group’s function in a capacity other than as a candidate, 
e.g., as a spokesperson for a particular issue.31  Questionnaires sent to candidates and 
disseminated to voters or the publication of voting records may be nonpartisan or they 
may evidence bias and thus constitute prohibited campaign activity.  Bias, according 
to the Service, can be inferred by the narrowness of the subjects covered, the timing 
of the distribution, or the extent of the distribution as well as by editorial content.32 
 In short, under the tax law, diverse activities and communications, none of 
which is an express endorsement of one or more candidates for public office, may 
constitute political intervention of the kind that is prohibited to 501(c)(3) 
organizations and subject to restrictions in the case of other groups exempt under 
Code section 501(c). 
 
  
B.  The Minimalist Campaign Finance Law Approach 
  
 Traditionally, the three main types of federal campaign finance regulation 
were disclosure rules (primarily registration and reporting rules); limitations on the 
                                                 
 27  See Bar of the City of New York, supra note 26, at 880-82. 
 28  It is unnecessary to include all candidates, however.  See Judith E. Kindell and John 
Francis Reilly, Election Year Issues, in IRS, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS TECHNICAL 
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2002/CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION I-335, 
374 (2002) (hereinafter 2002 CPE). 
 29  Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 CUM. BULL. 73, explicitly mentions facts and 
circumstances “establishing” a neutral manner.  Rev. Rul. 74-574 notes that, despite 
inviting all candidates, if the format or questions “show a bias or a preference for or 
against a particular candidate,” the forum will not be considered neutral.  
 30  See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 CUM. BULL.1421, 1423 (Situations 7-9); Kindell & 
Reilly, supra note 28, at 381. 
 31  See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, supra note 30, at 1423-24; Kindell & Reilly, supra note 28, 
at 381-82. 
 32  Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 CUM. BULL. 154; Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 CUM. BULL. 
178. For other factors affecting whether election related activities will be characterized 
as political intervention , see infra Part II.A.  
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amount that individuals and entities can contribute in a year or election cycle to 
candidates and parties or to their committees (the “amount” rules); and prohibitions 
on corporations and unions spending money from their general funds for certain types 
of election related speech (the “source” rules).  In 2010, in Citizens United, the 
Supreme Court invalidated the source rules for corporations (and, by implication, for 
unions) making independent expenditures, although it upheld the disclosure rules 
applicable to  such expenditures and did not address the validity of the rules 
preventing corporations and unions from making political contributions.33   
 The categories of campaign activity subject to regulation by FECA are for the 
most part precisely and narrowly defined, a fact usually explained in terms of First 
Amendment considerations. Specifically, the Supreme Court takes the view that 
campaign related speech is core political speech that is protected by the First 
Amendment of the Constitution and essential to the successful working of democratic 
processes.34  When such speech is burdened by regulation, the government must 
justify its action by demonstrating a sufficiently strong state interest and persuading 
the Court that the restrictions imposed are designed to accomplish that interest in a 
fashion no broader than the Constitution permits.35 
 As elaborated by the courts, the First Amendment protection of political 
speech permits regulations instituted to prevent corruption or the appearance of 
corruption in elections, although not to equalize the resources available to different 
participants in the political process.  Campaign contributions are the most heavily 
regulated activities by FECA because they involve transfers made directly to 
candidates or parties and, thus, are most likely to leave the recipients feeling indebted 
to the donors.36 In contrast, funds spent by people or organizations independent of a 
campaign and spent independently of the campaign are subject to the least amount of 
regulation..  According to the Supreme Court in Buckley, the reason is that, if the 
individual or group paying for a political communication during a campaign acts 
independent of candidates and political parties, the risk of corruption is less likely 
than with campaign contributions because the candidate and party will not control the 
timing or content of the communication and might even find it unhelpful.37 
                                                 
 33  See supra note 13.   
 34  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam). 
 35  The Court will applies two distinct levels of heightened scrutiny, depending upon 
the type of campaign activity involved and the degree to which the speaker’s speech is 
burdened.  These are discussed infra Part III. 
       36   See Buckley, supra note 34, at 25-28; Error! Main Document Only.United States 
v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 577-578 (1957) (quoting a Senator stating that large 
contributions make political parties feel obligated to the donors). Cf. id. at 29-30.   
37   Buckley, supra note 34, at 47.  There is a disconnect between the theory, which has 
no empirical support, and reality.  Presumably when donors give millions to non-registered 
527 groups, which are not subject to FECA source and amount rules even though they are 
known to support specific candidates or parties, the candidates benefited notice and can be 
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 The threat of corruption is nonetheless real when independent expenditures38 
are made to endorse a specific candidate, since express endorsements are likely, or 
would appear likely, to make the candidate feel beholden to the source of funds spent 
so visibly on his or her behalf.39 In short, the feeling of being beholden to a 
contributor, or political debt, is viewed as the petri dish in which corruption, or the 
appearance of corruption, is nourished. Thus, although it struck down proposed dollar 
limits on independent expenditures, the Buckley Court upheld FECA’s independent 
expenditure disclosure rules “to achieve through publicity the maximum deterrence to 
corruption and undue influence possible” in addition to its role in providing voters 
with information about sources of funding.40 Of course, if individuals or groups 
coordinate their activities with candidates, political parties, or their committees, the 
possibility of corruption or the appearance of corruption is treated by campaign 
finance law the same as if the funds were actually contributed to those who benefit 
because coordinated actions are likely to create, or appear to create political debt to 
the same degree as direct contributions.41 
 Kennedy’s opinion in Citizens United, in contrast to the Buckley opinion, 
made a point of emphasizing the informational value of disclosure to the exclusion of 
its role in deterring corruption.42  This may be due to the Citizens United majority’s 
                                                                                                                                            
expected to feel indebted. 
38   Although FECA does not define people who are independent, it does define 
“independent expenditures” as funds used for express advocacy of a candidate for federal 
office if they are “not made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of 
such candidate, the candidate’s authorized political committee or its agents, or a political party 
committee or its agents.”  2 U.S.C. § 431(17).  See 11 C.F.R § 109.21(d). 
39  See Buckley, supra note 34, at 27–28, 45. The Court does not categorically declare 
this is the case, and its holding only assumes the proposition’s validity “arguendo.” But this is 
the clear implication of the Court’s comment that expenditure limits limited to express 
advocacy would leave a “loophole” for those seeking to exert “improper influence” on a 
candidate through large expenditures of money.  Id. at 45.  The Court’s prediction, of course, 
has proved correct.  Further, it is common for those who make contributions or expenditures 
classified as “independent” under FECA to have significant ties to the candidates or parties 
they are supporting.  See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003) (noting, as a 
matter of law, Congress’s concern that access to a candidate can be “sold” even by a group 
independent of the candidate and his or her campaign), id., at 156 n.51; SpeechNow.org v. 
FEC, 567 F. Supp. 2d 70, 75 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting the “close relationships between party 
operatives and the persons running prominent 527 organizations (who were in some instances 
one and the same),” although they did not “violate[...] the letter of the law on independence 
and non-coordination”), id. at 80. 
40  Buckley, supra note 34, at 76.  See id. at 66-67; FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. 
Camp. Committee, 533 U.S. 431, 433 (2001). 
41   See Buckley, supra note 34, at 46-47.   
42  See Citizens United, supra note 13, at *95 (referring only to the first of Buckley’s 
three justifications for disclosure) with id. at *100 (stating that the Court will not 
examine “the Government’s other asserted interests” because the informational 
function alone justifies the disclosure provision).  There is nothing in the Buckley 
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desire to place new limits on the meaning of corruption for campaign finance 
purposes, specifically to limit corruption to quid pro quo arrangements.43 Buckley had 
portrayed “undue influence” as a part of the corruption that campaign finance 
regulations could legitimately deter,44 and several subsequent Supreme Courts echoed 
the view that quid pro quo does not exhaust the meaning of corruption.45  However, 
the Citizens United opinion referred to corruption exclusively in terms of quid pro 
quo exchanges,46 and several Justices making up the Citizens United majority have 
explicitly limited the concept in that fashion.47 
 Until the Citizens United decision was handed down, FECA’s “source” rules 
prohibited corporations and labor organizations from spending money from their 
corporate or union general treasuries on express advocacy or electioneering 
communications.48  They were, however, free to spend unlimited amounts of money 
from their general treasuries on all kinds of election related communications and 
activities other than these two types of political speech.  The force of the general 
treasury funding restriction was severely narrowed in 2007 by Wisconsin Right to 
Life,49 and in 2010 Citizens United invalidated the general treasury funding restriction 
                                                                                                                                            
49  See WRTL, supra note 11, at 2667, which narrowed the meaning of “electioneering 
passage to suggest that the Buckley Court considered each of the three justifications 
listed to provide sufficient justification for the burden imposed by disclosure rules.  See 
supra note 39.    
43  See Citizens United, supra note 13, at *83-87. 
44  See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
45  See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388-389 (2000); Colo. 
Republican Fed. Camp. Committee, supra note 40, at 441; McConnell, supra note 39, 
at 143, 150, 152. 
46  See supra note 42 and Citizens United, supra note 13, at *60,  *79, *80.  For the 
dissent’s interpretation of the corruption precedents, see id. at *239-62.  
47  See McConnell, supra note 39, at 290-293 (Kennedy, J., with whom Justices Scalia 
and Thomas joined, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Buckley 
limited the government’s compelling interest to quid pro quo corruption and citing 
Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 
297 (1981) for this interpretation).  See also Campaign Finance Disclosure and the 
Legislative Process,  47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS 75, 92-95 (2010).  
48  See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(2).  Buckley, supra note 34, at 43-44, appeared to 
assume the validity of the provision as it relates to express advocacy, as did FEC v. 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986), and FEC v. Beaumont, 539 
U.S. 146 (2003).  McConnell, supra note 39, which upheld the electioneering 
communication provision against a facial challenge, also assumed the validity of the 
source prohibition relating to express advocacy, as did WRTL, which linked the 
electioneering communication provision of FECA to communications that were the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy.  The phrases “general treasury” and 
“general treasury funds” refer to an entity’s funds resulting from its business 
operations; these terms are contrasted, inter alia, with funds it raises for an affiliated 
political action committee (“PAC”).   Corporations and unions were able to fund 
express advocacy and electioneering communications through their PACs. 
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completely.50  As a result, corporations and unions are now permitted to use the 
revenue accumulated from their business operations to fund express advocacy or any 
other kind of campaign speech. This development not only erased the source 
restrictions on federal campaign financing. According to Professor Daniel Ortiz, as a 
practical matter, it undermined FECA’s restrictions on soft money51 as well, by 
enabling corporations to spend business revenue on ads in the pre-election period that 
avoid express advocacy and by creating doubt as to the constitutionality of the soft 
money provisions themselves.52 
 There is, then, a stark contrast between the breadth of the conception of 
campaign related speech subject to regulation for purposes of the federal tax law and 
the counterpart concept subject to federal campaign finance law.  For campaign 
finance law purposes, it is unclear whether any campaign related speech that is not 
coordinated with a candidate or a political party can be subject to federal campaign 
                                                                                                                                            
communications” to instances in which the communication is also express advocacy or 
its “functional equivalent.” 
50  See Citizens United, supra note 13 (overruling McConnell, supra note 39, as it 
applied to electioneering communications and Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990),as it applied to independent corporate spending ).  
Many commentators had concluded that WRTL effectively overruled the electioneering 
communication portion of McConnell.  See Christopher J. Peters, Under-the-Table 
Overruling, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2008) (stating that WRTL “gutted 
McConnell’s conclusion” that the electioneering communication provision was not 
unconstitutionally broad); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Difference Two Justices Make: FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. II and the Destabilization of Campaign Finance 
Regulation, 1 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 141, 142 (2008) (asserting that the holding in 
WRTL II “robs the [electioneering communication] ban of any content”); Richard L. 
Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v 
Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 n MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1065 (2007) (stating that WRTL 
“mostly eviscerated” the ban on corporate and union soft money funding for pre-
election sham issue ads).  Seven justices in Wisconsin Right to Life agreed that the 
formula articulated by the WRTL plurality opinion amounted to overruling McConnell.  
See WRTL, supra note 11, at 2683 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in the result), 2699-2700 
(Souter, J., dissenting).  According to Samuel Issacharoff, the WRTL decision signaled 
that the Court was  “poised once again to make a decisive move against Buckley.”  The 
Constitutional Logic of Campaign Finance Regulation, 36 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 373, 
374 (2009).  So far, the Court has framed its actions as strengthening Buckley by 
overruling precedents unfaithful to Buckley’s teachings. 
51  “Soft money” refers to contributions that can be raised without satisfying FECA’s 
disclosure, amount, and source rules.   See McConnell, supra note 39, at 122-123.  It is 
also sometimes referred to as “non-federal” or “unregulated” money.  “Issue ads” can 
be paid for by “soft,” i.e., unregulated money, in contrast to “express advocacy,” which 
had to be paid for with “hard” money, i.e., money subject to FECA disclosure, amount, 
and source restrictions.  See Buckley, supra note 34, at 66-68 (employing strict scrutiny 
to evaluate the constitutionality of disclosure rules);  Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 
supra note 48, at 252-53 (same). 
52  See Ortiz, supra note 50, at 162-163.  
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finance regulation.53  The theory appears to be that, if the support of candidates or 
political parties is communicated independent of them, the First Amendment protects 
it from everything except disclosure regulation.  Under federal income tax law, in 
contrast, not only express advocacy, but any campaign related speech or other action 
that supports or opposes a candidate for public office may be subject to restrictions, 
depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. 
 
II.   ANTITHETICAL AGENCY METHODOLOGIES 
A.  The Tax Law Facts and Circumstances Approach 
As was noted earlier, there are few bright line rules to follow to determine 
 the Service’s facts and circumstances test is captured by a 
 
 
 
 
whether a given election related activity falls within the tax law’s capacious 
understanding of political campaign activity.54  From the time of its earliest rulings in 
this area, the Service has taken the position that it will look at all of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding an activity to determine if it is prohibited to 501(c)(3) 
organizations  or restricted to other groups exempt under section 501 of the Code.  
Making these determinations, of course, can involve the agency in complex and 
nuanced examinations. 
 The character of
Revenue Ruling issued in 2004.55  The ruling sets out six situations in which an 
organization exempt under section 501(c)(4), 501(c)(5), or 501(c)(6) funds one or 
more radio or print advertisements in the weeks preceding an election.  Several 
additional facts are common to all six situations.  In each, the nonprofit group funds a 
communication discussing an issue of concern to the group and urges whoever hears 
or reads the ad to contact a named public official to urge him or her to take some 
action consistent with the nonprofit’s agenda, and in each, the public official is a 
candidate in the coming election.56  Thus, all the situations have numerous facts that 
                                                 
53 The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), 116 Stat. 81, enacted, 
 necessarily be classified as campaign activity for federal 
e may be asked to take a certain 
and the McConnell Court upheld, regulation of communications funded by state parties 
or committees, that “support” or “oppose” candidates for federal office. See 2 U.S.C. 
§§ 431(20), 441i(b), (c); McConnell, supra note 39, at 170.  It is uncertain whether the 
Supreme Court will in the future conclude that such communications are independent.  
See Miriam Galston, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and Justifications for 
Campaign Finance Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO. L.J. 1181, 1210-11 
(2007) (discussing the relationship between such state funded communications and 
coordinated expenditures).   
54  Express advocacy would
tax law purposes, as would contributing money to or coordinating with a campaign. 
55  See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 CUM. BULL. 328. 
56  For example, a candidate for Governor of a stat
position regarding an imminent death penalty execution or a candidate for a legislature 
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suggest, although they do not necessitate, that the organization sponsoring the ad is 
attempting to influence the outcome of the election by portraying a candidate for 
public office as in favor of or in opposition to the group’s objectives. 
 At the same time, each situation described in the Revenue Ruling might also 
be interpreted as grassroots lobbying, which would not be considered campaign 
intervention under the Code.  For example, the group urges the recipients of the 
communication to ask the official named to fund something the group cares about 
(local exports), to support or veto a legislative initiative, or to oppose capital 
punishment.  Under the tax law rules elaborated by the Service, sponsoring lobbying 
messages of this kind is permitted to 501(c)(3) groups up to a certain limit and is 
permitted to a nonprofit exempt under other subsections without any limit as long as 
the subject of the lobbying is germane to the organization’s mission.57 
 The 2004 Revenue Ruling outlines the types of facts and circumstances that 
will determine whether, on balance, the Service considers the nonprofits in each of the 
six situations to be engaged in campaign intervention or issue advocacy.  For 
example, if the communication being questioned is part of a series of similar public 
messages sponsored by the organization  over a period of time, including times not 
scheduled to coincide with an election, the pre-election message is more likely to be 
classified as grassroots lobbying and less likely to be considered campaign activity.58  
Similarly, if the pre-election message is linked to a specific event occurring near the 
time of the election, the pre-election message is more likely to be considered 
grassroots lobbying, especially if the non-election event is outside the organization’s 
control.  For example, if an execution is scheduled to take place shortly before or after 
the election in that state and the organization’s pre-election  message deplores capital 
punishment and urges citizens to call Governor X and tell him to place a moratorium 
on executions because of racial unfairness in sentencing patterns, the message might 
be classified as grassroots lobbying, even if capital punishment was a wedge issue in 
the Governor’s race in that state.59  These facts would not, however,  prevent the 
                                                                                                                                            
may be urged to vote for or against a legislative proposal.  See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, supra 
note 55, at 334, 
57  Charities described in section 501(c) can lobby as long as the activity is not 
“substantial.” See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(I), -1(c)(3)(ii).  
Nonprofits exempt under other subsections of section 501 can lobby without limit in 
furtherance of their exempt purposes. See Rev. Rul. 71-530, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 237; 
Rev. Rul. 67-187, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 185; Rev. Rul. 61-177, 1961-2 CUM. BULL. 117 
(501(c)(6) groups). 
58  See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, supra note 55, at 330 (Situation 1), 332 (Situation 5). 
59  Contrast Rev. Rul. 2004-6, supra note 55, at 332 (Situation 5) (where an execution 
had been scheduled and the message was part of an series, the pre-election message was 
not campaign activity even though the candidate’s position was identified as opposed to 
that of the organization) and id. (Situation 6) (where there was no external event 
scheduled and the message was not part of an series, the pre-election message was 
campaign activity).  
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Service from finding that the organization sponsoring the message was engaged in 
campaign activity if the external event allegedly motivating the message was a bill in 
the state legislature, say, to end capital punishment and it could be shown that the 
sponsoring organization had influenced the date on which the vote in the legislature 
was scheduled to coincide with the election.  Other facts possibly suggesting the 
existence of campaign activity would be mentioning in the ad that the official to be 
contacted supports or opposes the position favored by the nonprofit,60 even if the ad 
avoids stating whether he or she is, or is not, fit to hold that office. 
 The balancing method utilized by the Service in Revenue Ruling 2004-6 is 
identical to the method it has employed in the other Revenue Rulings discussing voter 
education and other types of activities that can be partisan or nonpartisan, depending 
upon the manner in which they are conducted.61 At bottom, it entails the exercise of 
judgment to identify significant facts, interpret them in light of the context in which 
they occur, and determine the weight to accord to each. 
 
 B.    The Campaign Finance Law Bright Line Approach 
 
 Although a facts and circumstances test may seem a reasonable way to 
appreciate the complex character of an entity’s election related activities, the probing 
and balancing method they serve contrasts sharply with the bright line rule approach 
favored by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo and subsequent decisions and 
reasserted by the plurality opinion in Wisconsin Right to Life.  The Buckley Court 
originally enunciated the express advocacy bright line rule in response to its concern 
that the vague “for the purpose of influencing a federal election” language in 
campaign finance law would have the effect of chilling non-campaign speech, 
especially the discussion of ideas and candidates.62 The Buckley Court did not claim 
that all campaign related speech other than express advocacy was discussion of ideas 
and candidates.  Rather, it noted that it could be difficult to distinguish core campaign 
speech (urging the public to vote for or defeat a candidate) from other forms of 
political speech and issue discussion.63  The express advocacy rule was a response to 
this dilemma since it created a bright line rule to differentiate regulated speech from 
speech not subject to campaign finance regulation.  The electioneering 
communication provisions enacted in 2002 as part of the McCain-Feingold campaign 
finance reform were designed by Congress to add an additional, and important, 
category of campaign speech that should be funded with hard money and subject to 
                                                 
60  See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, supra note 55, at 330 (Situation 1), 332 (Situation 6).  But see 
id. at 332 (Situation 5) and supra note 44. 
       61   See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text; Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 CUM.     
BULL. 1421. 
62  See Buckley, supra note 34, at 76-80. 
63  See Buckley, supra note 34, at 78-79. 
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FECA disclosure while respecting Buckley’s preference for a bright line rule.  In 
upholding the constitutionality of these provisions, the McConnell Court appears to 
have accepted the  bright line rule approach as well.64  In ruling that regulation of 
electioneering communications was constitutional, the Court noted that there was no 
vagueness problem because the criteria listed in the definition were both “easily 
understood and objectively determinable.”65 
 In Wisconsin Right to Life, the Supreme Court rejected the electioneering 
communication provision, despite the fact that it created a bright line rule, because the 
provision could apply to more than express advocacy or its “functional equivalent.”66  
At the same time, the Court reiterated its commitment to a bright line standard, 
emphasizing that campaign finance provisions should not be applicable in a way that 
“opens the door to a trial” on every communication an organization contemplates 
funding or necessitate elaborate discovery.67  For  the plurality  Wisconsin Right to 
Life opinion, that meant  rejecting the FEC’s intent-and-effect test for classifying 
campaign ads, because the test would require examining the larger context within 
which political communications were designed and broadcast to determine if they 
should be funded with hard money.68 The opinion strengthened its “four-corners-of-
the-text” rule by asserting that, if evidence of the existence of campaign activity and 
evidence of issues advocacy are equal, “the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.”69  
The practical effect of the WRTL analysis is to create a presumption that political 
speech that is not express advocacy must be deemed to be issue discussion or 
grassroots lobbying until proven otherwise, and to require the government to satisfy 
this burden of proof without utilizing evidence that a court would consider more than 
minimally contextual.70  
 The Citizens United decision left this part of Wisconsin Right to Life’s 
doctrine intact. Thus, the method now employed by the IRS to determine whether a 
nonprofit organization has intervened in a political campaign is exactly the method 
the Court rejected in Wisconsin Right to Life, namely a facts and circumstances test 
                                                 
64  The McConnell Court also upheld the constitutionality of a more indeterminate 
support/oppose standard, but only with regard to state and local political parties.  See 
McConnell, supra note 39, at 166-70. 
65  McConnell, supra note 39, at 194. 
66  WRTL, supra note 11, at 2665.  The Court attributed the requirement that 
electioneering communications be express advocacy or its functional equivalent to the 
McConnell Court, id at 2655, although the four dissenting justices in WRTL, who were 
part of the majority in McConnell, were adamant that this interpretation was not the 
opinion of the McConnell Court.  See id. at 2699. 
67  WRTL, supra note 11, at 2665-66 (asserting that “it must entail minimal if any 
discovery”). 
68  WRTL, supra note 11, at 2665-67.   
69  WRTL, supra note 11, at 2669. 
70  The plurality opinion did agree that some recourse to context would be valid under 
its interpretation of the constitutional constraints.  See  WRTL, supra note 11, at 2669. 
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that entails taking into account the larger context in which a communication or other 
activity occurs.  Additionally, in federal tax cases, the organization seeking to avoid 
violating the campaign prohibition has the burden of proof, whereas the effect of 
Wisconsin Right to Life’s tie breaking rule is to place the burden of proof on the 
government, even as it restricts the government’s access to arguably relevant 
information. 
  
III.   JUDICIAL SCRUTINY: STRICT OR LIGHT 
 
 First Amendment issues have arisen repeatedly in connection with tax law 
regulations.  Judicial controversies involving a First Amendment challenge to the 
denial of tax exemption or tax deduction have developed a doctrine independent of 
First Amendment jurisprudence in other areas involving free speech.  The level of 
scrutiny that courts employ in such cases depends upon whether, as a threshold 
matter, the court finds that the government has burdened the challenger’s speech.  As 
is described in what follows, in general, if there is no burden as a matter of law, the 
courts subject the government’s actions to the rational relation test–the lightest form 
of judicial scrutiny in the freedom of speech area.  If, on the other hand, the 
government’s actions are seen as burdening the speech rights of the affected party, the 
courts use some form of heightened scrutiny to determine whether the government has 
subjected the affected party to an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a 
governmental benefit. 
 
 A. The Deferential Tax Law Approach 
 
 The tax law First Amendment decisions are, in general, deferential to 
government restrictions on deductions or exemptions because the courts have 
repeatedly stated their reluctance to second guess lawmakers’ determinations in the 
area of tax.  As early as 1940, the Supreme Court asserted that a legislature’s tax 
classifications have “a presumption of constitutionality.”71 Because of this 
presumption, the “burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to 
negative every conceivable basis which might support it.”72  As a corollary, the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence in tax cases thus entails that in tax 
cases, "statutory classifications are valid if they bear a rational relation to a legitimate 
governmental purpose."73   
                                                 
71  Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (cited in TWR, supra note 14, at 547).  
The Court noted that the government’s discretion in tax classifications is even greater 
than it is in other fields.  Id. 
72  Madden, supra note 71, at 88.  
73  TWR, supra note 14, at 547.  There is some ambiguity in the statement, however, 
since the full sentence reads “Generally, statutory classifications are valid...,” and, as is 
discussed in what follows, the Court will subject statutes to a higher level of scrutiny in 
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 If, however, tax classifications burden “the exercise of a fundamental right, 
such as freedom of speech, or employ a suspect classification, such as race,” courts 
will employ “a higher level of scrutiny.”74  Further, courts will subject to "strict 
scrutiny" any affirmative burden that the government places on speech on the basis of 
its content.75 Judicial deference to legislative judgments in tax cases thus may be 
diminished in certain instances involving the First Amendment, although the level of 
scrutiny or deference has not always been clearly articulated.76  Importantly, tax 
statutes that selectively exempt, or fail to exempt, specific categories of speakers are 
not necessarily “constitutionally suspect,” however.77  They only trigger heightened 
scrutiny if in addition they discriminate on the basis of content, run the risk of 
suppressing specific ideas or points of view, target the press, or target a “small group 
of speakers.”78 
 The seminal 1959 case, Cammarano v. United States, reveals how the 
Supreme Court determines whether the threshold condition for “a higher level of 
scrutiny” is present, i.e., whether a fundamental right has been burdened.  In that 
decision, the Court upheld a provision of the Code that denied taxpayers an otherwise 
valid business expense deduction for the cost of lobbying.79  The taxpayers had 
argued that the Code provision  denied them a business expense deduction because of 
their involvement in constitutionally protected First Amendment speech.  In rejecting 
their claim, the Court countered that the taxpayers’ exercise of free speech was not 
burdened by the denial of a deduction. Rather, according to the Court, the taxpayers 
were only being required to pay for their lobbying activities without a government 
subsidy.80 The denial of a subsidy for First Amendment activities, in other words, did 
not infringe on the exercise of a fundamental right. As a result, the application of 
                                                                                                                                            
certain circumstances. 
74  TWR, supra note 14, at 547.  This might seem to imply that the lobbying restriction 
at issue in the case should have been reviewed with a higher level of scrutiny than the 
rational relation test since the restriction affects freedom of speech.  However, later in 
the decision, the Court notes that when Congress fails to subsidize a fundamental right, 
it does not infringe that right.  See id. at 549. 
75  See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991); Grossjean v. US, 297 
U.S. 244-47.  See also infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (on Speiser). 
76  See the discussion in Am. Soc’y of Ass’n Executives v. U.S., 23 F. Supp. 2d 64, 68-
69 (D.D.C. 1998), affirmed, 195 F.3d 47 (1999). 
77  Leathers v. Medlock, supra note 75, at 444.  See also infra note 80 and 
accompanying text. 
78  Leathers v. Medlock, supra note 75, at 447. 
79  See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).   
80  See Cammarano, supra note 79, at 513 (denying the taxpayers a deduction deprived 
them not of free speech, but of free speech at the government’s expense).  In his 
concurrence, Justice Douglas observed that the First Amendment would have been 
violated only if Congress had denied all deductions for ordinary and necessary expenses 
to a taxpayer who lobbied.  Id. at 515. 
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heightened scrutiny was not warranted.81 
 In Cammarano, the Supreme Court, in dicta, compared the policy underlying 
the ban on business deductions for lobbying expenses with the policy embodied in the 
provision of the tax law denying charitable tax exemption to otherwise qualified 
501(c)(3) organizations if they engage in a substantial amount of lobbying.82  More 
than two decades later, in Taxation with Representation, the constitutionality of the 
limits on lobbying by charities was itself subject to a direct challenge.  The Supreme 
Court reiterated the teaching of Cammarano that it is no infringement upon speech to 
deny it a subsidy, and it expanded Cammarano by stating that strict scrutiny would 
not be required even if Congress chose to provide a tax subsidy selectively, e.g., to 
some but not all categories of exempt organizations.83  As a result, the Court ruled 
against the public interest organization in the case, which had been denied 501(c)(3) 
charitable exemption because it proposed to lobby in excess of the statutory lobbying 
limit.84  In both Cammarano and Taxation with Representation, the Supreme Court 
discussed the government’s stated goal, that political “controversies ... must be 
conducted without public subvention; the Treasury stands aside from them.”85  In 
both cases, the Court emphasized that as a constitutional matter, “a legislature's 
decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the 
right.”86  Thus, the government’s goal of securing its own neutrality and a level 
playing field for those who lobby was subjected to a minimal burden of 
justification.87  As the Cammarano Court explained, “[s]ince purchased publicity can 
influence the fate of legislation which will affect, directly or indirectly, all in the 
community, everyone should stand on the same footing as far as the Treasury is 
or the intent to suppress certain ideas, as occurred in Speiser v. Randall.89  In that 
           
concerned.”88 
 A tax classification, or a failure to subsidize a fundamental right, nonetheless 
may violate the Constitution if a legislature’s action involves content discrimination 
                                      
81  See Cammarano, supra note 79. 
82  See Cammarano, supra note 79, at 512. 
83  See TWR, supra note 14, at 548.  See also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 
egulations, an 
ammarano, supra note 79, at 512 (citing Slee v. Commissioner, supra note 22, at 
dment rights are somehow not 
ed by the State”). 
(1991); Leathers v Medlock, supra notes 75,at 73-74 and accompanying text. 
84  See TWR, supra note 14. Under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and the associated r
organization can engage only in an “insubstantial” amount of lobbying.   
85  C
85). 
86  TWR, supra note 14, at 549.  See also Cammarano, supra note 79, at 535 (Douglas, 
J., concurring) (criticizing “the notion that First Amen
fully realized unless they are subsidiz
87  See the discussion infra at ___.  
88  Cammarano, supra note 79, at 513. 
89  TWR, supra note 14, at 548, citing Cammarano, supra note 79, at 513, which cited 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958).  See also Leathers v Medlock, supra note 
75. In Speiser, the Court struck down statutory provision, itself based upon a provision 
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case, a provision of the California Constitution and implementing legislation denied 
the State’s veterans property tax exemption to any veteran who failed to sign a loyalty 
oath stating that the signatory did not advocate the violent overthrow of the 
government nor support a foreign nation at war with the United States.90  The 
exemption in question was sought by certain World War II veterans who had received 
honorable discharges and refused to sign the oath.91  The Supreme Court concluded 
that the constitutional provision should be interpreted to mean what the California 
Supreme Court said it meant, i.e., that it applied only to those who actually engaged in 
speech that would be criminally punishable under California criminal law and not to 
abstract advocacy.92  Thus construed, the loyalty oath was unconstitutional because it 
imposed on individuals failing to sign the oath an unreasonable condition, namely, the 
burden of proving they were not in violation of criminal law.93  This violated the 
applicants’ due process rights because the state’s reliance on a “short-cut” procedure 
(the oath) might well have the effect of infringing upon their free speech.94   
 The Speiser Court said explicitly that the loyalty oath required by California 
was “frankly aimed at the suppression of ideas.”95  When such factual situations arise, 
a heightened form of scrutiny, i.e., more than the rational relation test, is required to 
determine if the regulation in question is constitutional.  Subsequent tax law decisions 
have distinguished Speiser’s holding when explaining why a particular governmental 
action is valid.96  These tax cases are consistent with, and sometimes cite, First 
Amendment cases in other areas of the law invalidating government discrimination 
based upon the content of speech or designed to suppress dangerous ideas.97 
 Tax cases involving speech restrictions in connection with deductions or 
                                                                                                                                            
of the California constitution, that denied a property tax exemption to persons who did 
not sign a loyalty oath. 
90  Speiser, supra note 89, at 515. 
91  Speiser, supra note 89, at 514-15. 
92  See Speiser, supra note 89, at 519-20. 
93  See Speiser, supra note 89, at 523-24. 
94  See Speiser, supra note 89, at 528-29.  However, neither signing or failing to sign 
the oath was conclusive as to an applicant’s entitlement to the exemption.  See id. at 521 
n.6. 
95  Speiser, supra note 89, at 519. 
96  See, e.g., Cammarano, supra note 79, at 513 (rejecting the plaintiffs’ analogy to 
Speiser on the ground that there was no suppression of ideas in the tax statute); TWR, 
supra note 14, at 548, 550 (noting the outcome would be different if the tax provision 
involved “the suppression of dangerous ideas”). 
97  For example, Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972) (invalidating summary 
judgment for a state college that failed to renew a faculty member on the grounds that 
the nonrenewal may have been a result of the fact that the faculty member had criticized 
the school publicly, including before a legislative committee).  See also FCC v. League 
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984) (invalidating a regulation prohibiting 
nonprofit broadcast stations that were recipients of federal funds from editorializing, 
which, the Court said, was suppression of speech based upon content).  
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exemptions are portrayed by the Supreme Court as a subset of cases involving a 
government subsidy or grant.98  In some non-tax subsidy cases, the Court’s analysis is 
framed in terms of the nature and validity of the conditions the government has placed 
on the recipient, or potential recipient, of government funds.99  In general, these cases 
examine the type of government benefit involved, the character of the right affected 
by the condition imposed, the degree of the burden imposed by the condition, the 
importance of the government’s reason for imposing the condition, and the 
relationship between the government’s purpose and the means chosen to achieve it.100 
 Subsidy cases are not, however, necessarily analyzed within this framework.  
For example, in Rust v. Sullivan, the plaintiff organization challenged a speech 
restriction imposed upon the receipt of federal funds as an unconstitutional 
condition.101  In rejecting the claim that this was an unconstitutional condition case, 
the Court said 
 
our "unconstitutional conditions" cases involve situations  in which the 
Government has placed a condition on the recipient  of the subsidy rather than 
on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient 
from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally 
funded program.102 
 
                                                 
98  See, e.g., TWR, supra note 14, at 544 (stating that “tax exemptions and tax 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).  
exemption and 
deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system”).  The 
Court’s equation of deductions and exemptions with subsidies has been challenged by 
numerous commentators.  See, e.g.,  
99  See, e.g., Legal Services Corp. v. 
100 On the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as applied in 
deduction cases, see John Simon, Harvey Dale, and Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax 
Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK 267, 276 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg, eds. 2006) (concluding 
thhat the area is sufficiently murky that accurate predictions are impossible). The 
literature discussing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in general is 
voluminous.  Some of the classic articles are Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the 
Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
913 (2006); Frederick Schauer, A UNIFYING THEORY?: Too Hard: Unconstitutional 
Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989 
(1995); Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 
(1989); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: 
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (1988).  In the words of Steven Gey, “Virtually everyone agrees that the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a mess.”  Contracting Away Rights: A Comment 
on Daniel Farber’s “Another View of the Quagmire,” 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 953, 953 
(2006). 
101  Rust, supra note 83, at 192.  
102  Rust, supra note 83, at 197. 
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 Rust involved Title X funding, and the speech restriction required recipients of 
Title X money to abstain from informing patients of abortion as a possible option for 
them to consider.  The Court concluded nonetheless that grant recipients were not 
prevented from counseling about abortion because they were free to engage in such 
counseling using premises that were physically separate from the facility receiving 
Title X funds.103  In support of its finding, the Court cited a passage in League of 
Women Voters to the effect that the speech restriction on government funding in that 
case would have been upheld if Congress had authorized the grant recipients to 
establish affiliated entities  to engage in the restricted speech without federal funds.104  
Thus, TWR,105 League of Women Voters, and Rust agree that if an alternate channel 
exists for speakers to engage in the type of speech restricted by a federal grant or 
subsidy, there is no burden (as a matter of law)106 and, a fortiori, no unconstitutional 
condition.107  Hence, the validity of the restriction must be justified employing only a 
tional basis test. 
B.   The Heightened Scrutiny of Campaign Finance Law 
als, non-business associations, corporations, the press, and other types of 
edia. 
 When campaign finance regulation is involved, however, the Supreme Court 
                                                
ra
 
 
 
 Outside the tax area, the Supreme Court has generally held that it will employ 
strict scrutiny or some other type of heightened scrutiny in cases involving restrictions 
on free speech.  As was stated in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal 
Communications Commission, content based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny 
and content neutral restrictions are evaluated by “intermediate scrutiny.108  These 
standards have been applied in a wide range of circumstances involving regulation of 
individu
m  
 
103  Rust, supra note 83, at 197. 
104  Rust, supra note 83, at 197, citing League of Women Voters, supra note 97, at  
400, which cited TWR, supra note 14. 
105  See infra notes 131-136 and accompanying text. 
106  Courts will concede that there is an economic burden, but an economic burden 
does not imply the existence of a legal burden.  See infra notes [149-50] and 
accompanying text. 
107  Arguably Velazquez should be included in this list.  In that case, the Court found 
that the absence of an alternative channel for indigent clients of federally subsidized 
legal services was an important factor leading it to invalidate the funding restriction 
imposed by Congress.  See Velazquez, supra note 99, at 546-47.  However, the Court 
also said that the restriction “suppressed speech inherent in the nature of the medium” 
(lawyering), id. at 543, and interfered with the judicial function, id. at 546.  Thus, it is 
unclear how the Court would have ruled had there been an alternate channel for the 
plaintiff’s clients.   
108  See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994) 
(basing this observation upon earlier Supreme Court decisions). 
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usually examines the regulations burdening speech using strict scrutiny.109  This 
standard typically entails determining whether restrictions on speech serve a 
compelling state interest and whether restrictions are narrowly tailored to further that 
interest.110 Starting with Buckley and continuing through Citizens United, the 
Supreme Court has maintained repeatedly and emphatically that the only compelling 
state interest justifying the regulation of campaign speech is the need to prevent 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.111  On several occasions, the Court has 
equated preventing influence over or access to elected officials with the compelling 
state interest in preventing corruption or its appearance.  For example, in McConnell, 
the Court noted that campaign finance regulation is justified to “prevent access and 
influence from being bought or sold,”112 and in Federal Election Commission v. 
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, the Court affirmed its 
understanding that corruption means “not only ... quid pro quo agreements, but also ... 
undue influence on an officerholder's judgment, and the appearance of such 
influence.”113   
 In Austin v. Michigan  State Chamber of Commerce, the Supreme Court 
enlarged the notion of corruption to include certain situations in which  the members 
or shareholders of a corporation do not necessarily approve the political choices 
funded by 
it,114 an idea first endorsed in dicta by the Court in Massachusetts Citizens for Life.115  
In Citizens United, however, the Court repudiated this understanding of a compelling 
governmental purpose, expressly overruling Austin.116  In addition, the Court made 
                                                 
109  Usually, but not always.  See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. 
110  See WRTL, supra note 11, at 464; McConnell, supra note 39, at 115–16.  Not all 
courts use the phrase “strict scrutiny.”  The Court in Buckley, for example, said that 
restrictions affecting the First Amendment must be examine with “exacting scrutiny.” 
Buckley, supra note 34, at 64.  This has usually been equated with strict scrutiny.  See, 
e.g., McConnell, supra note 38, at 291 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part and concurring 
in part).  For a succinct statement of the strict scrutiny doctrine, with which he 
vehemently disagrees, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring 
and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418-24 (1997). 
111  See Buckley, supra note 34, at 25-26; Citizens United, supra note 13, at *60 
(describing the view of Buckley, with which the Court agreed).  Note, however, that in 
Citizens United, the Court emphasized the purpose of ensuring the receipt of 
information rather than corruption.  See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
112  McConnell, supra note 39, at 154.  See also FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 
459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982).  
113  FEC v. Col. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431,441 (2001) 
(Colorado II). 
114  494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990); see also FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 159, n. 5 
(2003) (noting that); 
115  See Massachusetts for Life, supra note 48, at 258 (asserting that “the power of the 
corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas”). 
116  See Citizens United, supra note 13, at *63-*79. 
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clear its intention to limit the concept of corruption to quid pro quo corruption rather 
than access or influence,117 even though it also noted that several times in the past the 
Court had observed that campaign finance “restrictions on direct contributions are 
preventative, because few if any contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo 
arrangements.118 
 Employing the corruption standard, the Supreme Court has struck down 
spending limits for candidates for Congress and state elections, limits on independent 
expenditures, a prohibition against corporate and union political advertisements on the 
eve of elections, various disclosure rules, a prohibition against certain advocacy 
organizations using their general corporate funds for campaign expenditures, and 
special financing rules for candidates running against high wealth, self-financed 
opponents.119  In Citizens United, the Court added to this list by concluding that the 
state interest in preventing corruption or its appearance was not sufficiently strong to 
justify denying corporations the ability to use business revenues to pursue their 
electoral objectives.120 
 On a few occasions, the Supreme Court has employed an intermediate level of 
scrutiny in campaign finance cases.  In general, intermediate scrutiny permits the 
government to demonstrate something less than a compelling interest to justify the 
imposition of restrictions on speech, if the means chosen to further that interest are in 
fact designed in a proper manner.  In First Amendment cases involving restrictions on 
speech, the Supreme Court has often stated that the test is satisfied if the restriction  
 
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential 
to the furtherance of that interest.121  
 
The means chosen satisfy this “essential” standard  if the government’s interest 
“would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.”122   
 In campaign finance cases, the Supreme Court appears to have used 
intermediate scrutiny when it evaluated the constitutionality of FECA’s limitations on 
the amount of political contributions that could be made to candidates and parties. In 
                                                 
117  See Citizens United, supra note 13, at *83-*85. 
118  See Citizens United, supra note 13, at *79.  The Court indicated that preventive 
measures were necessary, even though quid pro quo transactions would fall under 
bribery laws, because of evidentiary problems.  Id. 
119  See Davis v. FEC., 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008); WRTL, supra note 11; 
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006); Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra note 48; 
Buckley, supra note 34. 
120  See Citiznes United, supra note 13. 
121  United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
122  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). 
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Buckley, the Court applied what it referred to as the “lesser demand” of regulations 
being "closely drawn" to match a "sufficiently important [government] interest."123 In 
connection with FECA’s restrictions for public financing, the Buckley Court also 
compared the burden caused by these restrictions with the burden resulting from state 
law restrictions on ballot access. Although the latter were subject to “exacting 
scrutiny,” the Court was less rigorous with the former because public financing is 
“generally less restrictive of access” than ballot restrictions.124  The Court did not 
expressly label its method “intermediate scrutiny” (or anything else), but it appears 
that it was using such scrutiny since it was using a form of heightened scrutiny and 
was clearly not using strict scrutiny. 
 In short, tax and campaign finance jurisprudence embody distinct and 
generally inconsistent principles regarding the appropriate form of judicial scrutiny to 
test the constitutionality of restrictions on speech.  In the First Amendment tax cases, 
the courts gravitate toward the rational relation test because of the presumption of 
constitutionality, and heightened scrutiny is the exception.  In contrast, in campaign 
finance cases, the presumption is that strict scrutiny applies, and a lesser form of 
heightened scrutiny is the exception.  In the tax cases, it is permissible to discriminate 
on the basis of the identity of the speaker, whereas in campaign finance law it is not.  
In tax cases, the courts place the burden of proof on the party challenging a 
government restriction on speech, whereas in campaign finance law it is exactly the 
reverse.  Finally, underlying the tax restrictions is the government’s interest in 
equalizing access to government funding, whereas the campaign finance cases 
categorically reject equalizing speakers’ resources as a valid government purpose for 
burdening speech in any way.  As a result of these differences, tax law provisions that 
affect speech are far more likely to be upheld than are restrictions imposed by 
campaign finance law. 
 
IV.   TAX LAW FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED 
 
 Parts I-III gave an overview of the general principles of free speech doctrine in 
the areas of tax exemption and campaign finance.  This Part applies the tax law 
principles to the restrictions prohibiting section 501(c)(3) groups from engaging in 
                                                 
123  See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, supra note 45, at 387-88; see also 
Buckley, supra note 34, at 16 (expenditure limits require “exacting scrutiny”), at 20, 25-
26 (because contribution limits involve “only a marginal restriction” on free speech, 
they are constitutional where they are “closely drawn” to further the weighty interests” 
of preventing corruption);  WRTL, supra note 11, at 2664 (citing Buckley, supra note 
34, at 44-45, and four later cases repeating the need for strict scrutiny whenever 
“political speech” is burdened).  
124  See Buckley, supra note 34, at 94-96 (finding that such financing served 
“sufficiently important governmental interests and has not unfairly or unnecessarily 
burdened the political opportunity of any party or candidate”).  
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political campaign activity. 
 
 A. What Constitutes A Burden on Speech 
 
 Tax exempt groups described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code must meet both 
affirmative and negative requirements.  The affirmative requirement is that the group 
have as its purpose one or more public goods that the Code and regulations 
characterize generically as “charitable.” These include helping the poor, sick, or 
disadvantaged; promoting education, religion, science, literature, and public safety; 
lessening the burdens of government; and otherwise improving social welfare.125  The 
negative requirements prohibit 501(c)(3) groups from benefiting any insider (“private 
inurement”), having even one substantial non-exempt purpose, engaging in more than 
insubstantial lobbying, and participating or otherwise intervening  in an electoral 
campaign for public office.126 
 At first glance, based upon the traditional tax law constitutional jurisprudence 
discussed in Parts I-III, the absolute prohibition against 501(c)(3) organizations 
participating in electoral campaigns would seem not to violate the First Amendment.  
In a closely analogous situation, the Supreme Court in Taxation with Representation 
upheld the requirement that 501(c)(3) groups not engage in substantial lobbying.127 
Cammarano v. United States, also discussed above,128 similarly upheld a prohibition 
on deducting the cost of lobbying that would otherwise have been an ordinary and 
necessary business expense.  The foundation of both decisions was the doctrine that 
fundamental First Amendment rights are not burdened, as a matter of constitutional 
law, by being denied a tax benefit, since the First Amendment does not guaranty the 
right to exercise First Amendment freedoms at the government’s expense.129  Because 
the right to lobby and the right to be involved in political campaigns are both core 
First Amendment values,130 the constitutional analysis should be the same in both 
areas.   
 Taxation with Representation, however, is arguably inapposite because  the 
organization in that case was permitted to establish a sister 501(c)(4) organization that 
could lobby without limit, assuming that none of its funds were derived from the 
                                                 
125  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d).  The regulations 
additionally mention lessening “neighborhood tensions,” prejudice, discrimination, 
community deterioration, and juvenile delinquency, and promoting human and civil 
rights.  Id. at 11(d)(2). 
126   See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iii), (3), -1(c)(1), (3). 
127  See supra notes 83-88and accompanying text. 
128  See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. 
129  See Cammarano, supra note 79, at 513; TWR, supra note 14, at 544.  
130See Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 
137-138 (1961) (stating that lobbying is protected by the First Amendment), cited in 
TWR, supra note 14, at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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501(c)(3) group.131  Employing a sister organization this way would enable the 
501(c)(3) group to conduct its non-lobbying activities (and insubstantial lobbying 
activities as well) using money subsidized by the charitable contribution deduction 
available to the group’s donors, while its 501(c)(4) counterpart would lobby without 
funds thus favored.132  The 501(c)(3) group’s ability to lobby using an affiliated 
organization was noted by the majority opinion,133 and it was pivotal to the 
conclusion of Justice Blackmun’s concurrence that the taxpayer’s speech rights had 
not been infringed. 134 
 This structural arrangement, which became formalized as the alternative 
channel doctrine, is now considered to be crucial to the outcome in TWR.135  For the 
alternate channel to enable the 501(c)(3) group to lobby meaningfully, according to 
TWR, the group needed to be able to control an affiliated 501(c)(4) group’s lobbying 
message.136  In the area of campaign activity, however, the existence of an alternate 
channel for campaign activities is less clear cut than it was for lobbying.  Section 527 
of the Code provides for “political organizations,” which are exempt entities created 
and operated “to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of one 
or more candidates for public office.”137 Since a 501(c)(3) group is prohibited from 
creating an affiliated section 527 political organization to engage in campaign 
activities on its behalf,138 it seems to be denied the type of sister organization crucial 
to TWR’s validation of the lobbying limitation. 
 Section 501(c)(3) organizations are, however, permitted to establish one or 
more sister 501(c)(4) groups, and the latter are permitted to participate in campaigns 
                                                 
131  See TWR, supra note 14, at 544 n..6.  The Service also requires that the lobbying 
be in furtherance of the group’s exempt purpose.   
132  The 501(c)(4) group’s exemption is still a subsidy, according to the Court, 
although the group would be less heavily subsidized than a 501(c)(3) organization, 
which could combine the benefit of exemption with that of receiving funds entitled to 
the charitable contribution deduction.  See TWR, supra note 14, at 544 (stating that the 
exemption is the functional equivalent of a “cash grant”). [Buckles criticizes Tobin’s 
reliance on this difference to justify political campaign activity on subsidy grounds.] 
133  See TWR, supra note 14, at 545. 
134  See TWR, supra note 14, at 552-53.  The concurrence of Justice Blackmun was 
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. 
135  The majority opinion did not emphasize the alternate channel for lobbying 
available to the plaintiff, but the concurrence considered it indispensable to the outcome 
in the case, and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have adopted the view of the 
concurrence.  See FCC v. League of Women Voters, supra note 97,at 400 (1984); Rust 
v. Sullivan, supra note 83, at 196.  Several appellate and district courts have similarly 
interpreted TWR.  See Miriam Galston, Campaign Speech and Contextual Analysis, 6 
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 100, 113-17 (2007). 
136  See TWR, supra note 14, at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
137  See I.R.C. § 527(e)(1)-(2). 
138  See S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 30 (1974). 
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as long as they remain primarily dedicated to their core social welfare mission.139  
This limitation, coupled with the requirement that all activities not directed toward a 
501(c)(4) group’s social welfare mission must be aggregated to determine if the group 
retains its primary focus on its exempt purpose,140 creates an upper limit on the 
degree to which the sister organization can be involved in political campaigns.141  The 
opportunity for a 501(c)(3) organization to participate in campaigns through a sister 
501(c)(4) group would be correspondingly circumscribed.  Thus, the 501(c)(4) 
alternative channel for 501(c)(3) groups that wish to campaign may provide the 
501(c)(3) groups with a less extensive alternative channel than was available to the 
plaintiffs in Taxation with Representation.  At the same time, 501(c)(4) groups are 
themselves permitted to create affiliated section 527 political organizations.  A 
501(c)(3) group is thus permitted to have a sister 501(c)(4) organization that can 
engage in some campaign activity itself and can have an affiliated 527 organization 
devoted exclusively to participation in campaigns.142  Is this Rube Goldberg 
arrangement likely to satisfy the constitutional requirements of the alternate channel 
test? 
 No Supreme Court decision to date has addressed this question directly.143  
The closest the Cammarano decision comes is the assertion, made by Justice Douglas 
in his concurrence, that he would consider the denial of a business deduction for 
lobbying expenses to be a penalty if Congress were to deny a taxpayer that lobbies all 
business deductions, and not just a deduction for lobbying expenses.144  For the 
majority in that case, the taxpayers’ speech rights were not burdened merely because 
they had to pay for lobbying “out of their own pockets.”145  The majority opinion in 
Taxation with Representation struck the same note as Justice Douglas, observing that 
TWR was not being denied a charitable contribution deduction for its non-lobbying 
activities.146  Although it noted that there was some burden involved in setting up a 
501(c)(4) group,147 the majority concluded nonetheless that Congress had not 
                                                 
139  See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. 
140  See supra note 24. 
141  The 501(c)(4) group may be taxed, using its campaign expenditures as the tax 
base, depending upon whether it has net investment income.  See I.R.C. § 527(f)(1).  If 
the tax under this section would be large, this tax exposure might further restrain the 
sister organization’s campaign activities. 
142  See Kindell & Reilly, supra note 28, at 477-78. 
143  Precisely this issue was under review in Branch Ministries, supra note 14, 
however, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the 
political prohibition was constitutional, inter alia, because the plaintiff could establish a 
501(c)(4) group that could set up an affiliated PAC.  211 F.3d, at 143-44. 
144  See Cammarano, supra note 79, at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
145  Cammarano, supra note 79, at 513. 
146  See TWR, supra note 14, at 545. 
147  See TWR, supra note 14, at 544 n.6. 
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infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity.”148   
 These two cases thus suggest that the Supreme Court will be quite deferential 
to Congress when assessing the threshold issue, i.e., whether speech has been 
burdened as a matter of constitutional law.  They imply that an organization’s speech 
rights would be infringed only if it was prevented from engaging in First Amendment 
activity absolutely as a condition of receiving the tax exemption to which it was 
otherwise entitled.149 However, as noted above,150 the Taxation with Representation 
decision has been interpreted by later cases to say that the taxpayer’s speech rights 
would be infringed if there were no alternate channel for the exercise of those 
rights.151  Cammarano and Taxation with Representation (as interpreted by later 
cases) thus may advance different accounts of what constitutes a burden on political 
speech.  Further, Taxation with Representation’s less deferential approach sheds little 
light on the type of affiliation that will satisfy the alternate channel test beyond its 
assertion that the exempt organization must be able to control the content of the 
affiliated organization’s lobbying speech.  By themselves, then, these cases do not 
definitively answer the “Rube Goldberg” question. 
 A recent decision suggests, although it does not guaranty, that the Supreme 
Court would not find that the current campaign prohibition for 501(c)(3) 
organizations an infringement on the organizations’ free speech.  Ysursa v. Pocatello 
Education Association involved a challenge to an Idaho law prohibiting any public 
employer (state or local) from providing a payroll deduction for employees’ payments 
to their union’s PAC.152  The District Court concluded that Idaho’s refusal to provide 
a payroll deduction for political contributions for state employees was not an 
“abridgement of the unions’ speech” because Idaho was under no obligation to incur 
the cost of such a program.153 However, it found the State’s ban on local governments 
providing such a payroll deduction unconstitutional because no state subsidy was 
involved at the local level.154  Only the latter ruling was appealed to the Court of 
Appeals, which upheld the decision of the lower court.155   
 The Supreme Court reversed.  Although the constitutionality of the prohibition 
as it affected the state government was no longer being challenged, the Court 
nonetheless reviewed the issue and repeated the lower court’s reasoning that Idaho 
was under no obligation to “enhance” unions’ political speech nor “aid” them in their 
political activities” by means of a payroll deduction.156  The Court supplemented the 
                                                 
148  TWR, supra note 14, at 546. 
149  See League of Women Voters, supra note 97, at 395. 
150  See supra p. 25. 
151  See supra notes 135-36 and the accompanying text. 
152  See Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass’n, 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009). 
153  See Ysursa, supra note 152, at 1097. 
154 Ysursa, supra note 152, at 1097.  
155 Ysursa, supra note 152, at 1097. 
156 Ysursa, supra note 152, at 1098. 
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lower court’s reasoning by noting that Idaho had an “interest in avoiding the reality or 
appearance of government favoritism or entanglement with partisan politics.”157  The 
Court then used the latter rationale to justify the State’s ban on local governments 
providing a payroll deduction for contributions to a union PAC, even though local 
government payroll deductions cost Idaho nothing and, according to the unions,  
could not be considered a “subsidy” by the State.158   
 In Ysursa, the Supreme Court accepted as fact that “unions face substantial 
difficulties in collecting funds for political speech without using payroll 
deductions.”159 Despite this finding, the Court asserted that there was no infringement 
on the unions’ political speech and, thus, that the Idaho law should be reviewed using 
the rational basis test.160  To support its position, the Court repeatedly cited Taxation 
with Representation, which had also concluded that the economic burden caused by 
its decision was not of constitutional significance.  The Court in that case argued that  
 
[a]lthough TWR does not have as much money as it wants, and thus cannot 
exercise its freedom of speech as much as it would like, the Constitution does 
not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the 
advantages of that freedom.161 
 
These two decisions involving free speech reach the same outcome as the Supreme 
Court’s rulings in connection with the free exercise prong of the First Amendment, 
namely, that an organization’s loss of revenue as a result of revocation of its 
exemption “is not constitutionally significant.”162 
 The reasoning in Massachusetts Citizens for Life is consistent with these 
precedents. The Supreme Court in Massachusetts Citizens for Life invalidated a 
campaign finance law that required a corporate section 501(c)(4) group to fund certain 
of its campaign activities by using an affiliated political action committee (PAC) 
largely because of the administrative burden and related costs that the 501(c)(4) group 
would thereby experience.163  Although on the surface the Court’s decision seems 
inconsistent with the alternate channel reasoning in Taxation with Representation, in 
point of fact the Court in Massachusetts Citizens for Life went out of its way to 
distinguish Taxation with Representation on the ground that the alternate channel 
                                                 
157 Ysursa, supra note 152, at 1098. 
158 Ysursa, supra note 152, at 1101. 
159 Ysursa, supra note 152, at 1098. 
160  See Ysursa, supra note 152, at 1098. 
161  TWR, supra note 14, at 549. 
162  Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391-92 
(1990).  See Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 700 (1989).  See also Branch 
Ministries, supra note 14, at 142 (citing these two Supreme Court decisions to justify 
upholding the political prohibition for 501(c)(3) organizations). 
163  MCFL, supra note 48. 
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procedure “would infringe no protected activity, for there is no right to have speech 
subsidized by the Government.”164  Massachusetts Citizens for Life, in contrast, 
involved a direct restriction on the campaign activity of a nonprofit. 
 The Supreme Court’s reliance in Ysursa was exclusively on the majority 
opinion in Taxation with Representation, which, as was noted earlier,165 appears more 
deferential to Congress than was Blackmun’s concurrence.  In short, Ysursa suggests 
that the Roberts’ Court may be as willing as most previous Supreme Courts to find 
political speech unburdened as a constitutional matter when the effect of legislation 
denying an organization a tax favored status is to place it in a more burdensome 
economic position. 
 At least two appellate courts have issued similar rulings.  In American Society 
for Association Executives v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit said that the rational relation test applied to section162(e)’s denial 
of  business deductions for lobbying expenses, despite the provision’s potential 
economic impact on 501(c)(6) organizations and their members, because they were 
free to avoid the problems complained of  by setting up two 501(c)(6) organizations, 
one of which would not lobby at all.166  Citing Taxation with Representation, the 
court continued, “If this option is available, the treatment of lobbying contested here 
is subject only to ‘rational basis’ scrutiny, and, as we shall see, handily survives.”167 
Similarly, in Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, the Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a disclosure provision for section 
527 political organizations.168  Citing Taxation with Representation, the Eleventh 
Circuit said that, “[t]he fact that the organization might then engage in somewhat less 
speech because of stricter financial constraints does not create a constitutionally 
mandated right to the tax subsidy.”169    
      Based upon the reasoning in the preceding Supreme Court and appellate court  
decisions, the current tax law prohibition on 501(c)(3) groups participating in political 
campaigns is likely to be understood as creating an economic burden on the groups’ 
election related speech that does not create a corresponding constitutional burden. 
 The prohibition against campaign activity by charities might still be 
unconstitutional if it were seen as involving content discrimination by virtue of 
targeting “political” speech.   A challenge of this kind is unlikely to succeed, 
                                                 
164  MCFL, supra note 48, at 545-46. 
165  Supra note 135 and page 27. 
166  195 F.3d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1999).   
167  American Soc’y of Ass’n Execs., supra note 166, at 50.  
168  353 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2003) 
169  Mobile Republican Assembly, supra note 168, at 1361.  The court also said that it 
was following TWR, in which the Supreme Court “analyzed the [unconstitutional] 
condition within the context of the overall tax scheme, rather than as a separate 
provision or penalty” in response to TWR’s claim that the lobbying restriction was an 
unconstitutional condition.  Id. 
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however.  In Cammarano, the Supreme Court rejected the charge that the denial of a 
business deduction for the cost of lobbying was content based because it targeted 
lobbying, asserting instead that the provision in question was a “nondiscriminatory 
denial of a deduction” that was clearly not part of an attempt to suppress specific 
ideas.170  The Ysursa Court similarly rejected the claim that the Idaho statute 
prohibiting payroll deductions for contributions to union PACs was content based 
because of its impact on political speech.171 
 In sum, the threshold inquiry unto the existence of a burden resulting from the 
tax law’s political prohibition is likely to conclude that no such burden exists because 
501(c)(3) groups have a significant alternate channel for their campaign activities, 
economic burdens do not necessarily constitute legal burdens as a matter of 
constitutional law, and restrictions targeting campaign speech are not considered 
content discrimination.  
 
 B.  The Political Prohibition Scrutinized 
  
  Based upon the preceding, the tax law prohibition should be reviewed using 
the rational relation test.  This test is satisfied if government action is directed toward 
a legitimate government interest and the means chosen is rationally related to that 
goal.172  
 The legislative history is silent as to the reason the political prohibition was 
enacted in 1954.173  Prior to that time, the IRS had taken the position that political 
groups were subject to tax, there were judicial decisions supporting that position, and 
limitations on campaign activity had been proposed in Congress, but not enacted.174  
These precedents are consistent with the goal of preventing charities from funding 
campaign activity with deductible charitable contributions.175  To the extent that this 
                                                 
170  Cammarano, supra note 79, at 513. 
171  See Ysursa, supra note 152, at 1099.  It is difficult to imagine what would 
constitute a content based denial of funding by a court that rejected such a charge in 
connection with the federal government’s refuse to allow Title X funds to be used for 
abortion counseling or even counseling that mentioned abortion.  See Rust v. Sullivan, 
supra note 83, at 192-93.  Of course, the dissent disagreed with the majority on this 
point.  See id. at 209. 
172  TWR, supra note 14, at 547. 
173  See supra note 21. 
174  See William P. Streng. The Federal Tax Treatment of Political Contributions and 
Political Organizations, 29 TAX LAWYER 139, 142-43 (1976). Initially, the IRS took 
the opposite position, however.  See id. at 141. 
175  In general, the rational relation test does not require the government to show that it 
in fact pursued a legitimate public purpose.  See U.S. Railroad Retirement v. Fritz, 449 
U.S. 166, 179 (1980):  
Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at 
an end.  It is, of course, "constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in 
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is the goal of the political prohibition, the means chosen are reasonably related to the 
end, although they may not be the least restrictive means of achieving that 
objective.176  Current tax law, however, does more than prevent charitable 
contributions from being used to support campaign activities.177  Because of this, 
Professor Benjamin Leff has recently argued that the 501(c)(3) political prohibition 
could be unconstitutional “to the degree it goes beyond advancing a concern with 
expenditure equity.”178 However, Leff also cautions that a mechanism used to allocate 
the cost of campaign activity to an affiliated entity would have to take into account 
hidden costs, such as some portion of the expense of developing and maintaining the 
501 (c)(3) group’s credibility, in order to be completely accurate.179 
 A second possible rationale, one advanced by the Ysursa Court, is the 
government’s interest in not supporting or becoming entangled with partisan 
activities.180  This rationale does not seem applicable in relation to exempt 
organizations, however, because the Code in fact prohibits political intervention only 
in connection with 501(c)(3) groups, whereas other organizations exempt under 
501(a) are not included in the ban.181  Indeed, Congress enacted section 527 to 
provide exempt status for the income of political organizations and to favor donors to 
such organizations by removing the their gift taxation exposure for large 
                                                                                                                                            
fact underlay the legislative decision," Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S., at 612, 
because this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons 
for enacting a statute.  This is particularly true where the legislature must 
necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing.  The "task of classifying 
persons for . . . benefits . . . inevitably requires that some persons who have an 
almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of 
the line," Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83-84 (1976), and the fact the line 
might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, 
rather than judicial, consideration.   
I could not find an example of this reasoning in a Supreme Court case involving free 
speech or another fundamental right. 
176  The fact that certain veterans’ groups can engage in political campaigns, yet 
receive deductible contributions, does not undermine the rationality of the decision to 
prevent charities from intervening in campaigns.  The Supreme Court has several times 
made the point, in connection with subsidies, that the government is free to provide 
subsidies selectively to achieve purposes it deems beneficial.  See supra notes [76, 81]. 
177  See infra notes 183-87. 
178  Benjamin M. Leff, “Sit Down and Count the Cost”: A Framework for 
Constitutionally Enforcing the 501 (c)(3) Campaign Intervention Ban, 28 VA. TAX REV. 
673, 686 (2009).  See also Chris Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches, and the IRS: 
Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145 (2006) (arguing that under the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA), churches should be permitted to engage in political campaign activity as 
long as they do not use contributions tax deductible under section 170 of the Code).    
179  See Leff, supra note 178, at 708-14 
180  See supra notes [117-18] and accompanying text. 
181  See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text. 
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contributions.182  Thus, existing tax law does not seem to reveal concern with 
governmental neutrality toward campaign activity.   
 The legislative history of section 527 political organizations, which 
specifically denies 501(c)(3) groups the ability to establish a 527 group,183 suggests 
another possible rationale underlying the prohibition.  Congress could easily have 
authorized 501(c)(3) groups to establish affiliated 527 groups subject to restrictions 
precluding the former 
 groups from funding the latter groups with funds derived from deductible 
contributions, but it chose not to. This raises the possibility that preventing political 
activities from being funded with deductible contributions was not the exclusive 
rationale for preventing 501(c)(3) groups from political intervention.  The twin 
prohibitions against campaign intervention and establishment of a 527 group may 
reflect a belief that charitable exemption and partisan politics are incompatible.  
 The last explanation is consistent with the fact that the rationale for exempting 
501(c)(3) groups from federal income tax and for allowing contributors to them a 
charitable contribution deduction in the first place is to encourage the existence and 
viability of associations dedicated to particular public purposes enumerated in the 
Code and elaborated in the Treasury regulations.184  Section 501 of the Code is not a 
federal version of state nonprofit laws, which permit entities to organize as nonprofit 
organizations as long as they do not distribute their revenues and are not established 
for a pecuniary purpose.  Rather,  section 501(c) targets specific categories of public 
purpose that lawmakers have determined should be encouraged through a system of 
tax exemption and, in some instances, charitable contribution deduction.185  This 
would appear to be precisely the type of project selection that the Supreme Court has 
approved in the past in public funding cases.186  
                                                 
182  See I.R.C. § 527. 
. 
3 and the accompanying text. 
ng any nonprofit organization 
 M i
e 83, at 193-95; League of Woman Voters, supra 
note 97, at 399-400.  See also TWR, supra note 14, at 547-48 (rejecting the 
183  See supra note 135
184  See supra notes 122-2
185  It is possible to view section 501(c)(4) as describi
with a public purpose that doesn’t fit into other subsections of section 501(c).  See 
JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 990 (2006) (asserting that “[a]s a practical matter...§ 501(c)(4) has become 
the default choice (“dumping ground”?) for organizations that fail to make the grade” 
as charities).  While it is true that the meaning of “social welfare” in section 501(c)(4) is 
broad, not every nonprofit group that seeks 501(c)(4) status succeeds.  See, e.g., 
Contracting Plumbers Co-op. Restoration Corp. v. United States, 488 F.2d 684, 686-87 
(2d Cir. 1973); Rev. Rul. 77-273, 1977-2 CUM. BULL. 194; Rev. Rul. 61-158, 1961-2 
CUM. BULL. 115.  See also John Francis Reilly, Carter C. Hull, and Barbara A. Braig 
Allen, IRC 501(c)(4) Organizations, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS TECHNICAL 
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2003, I-1, I-9 to I-12; iriam Galston, V sion Service 
Plan v. U.S., Implications for the Campaign Activities of 501(c)(4) Groups, 53 EXEMPT 
ORG. TAX REV. 165 (August 2006). 
186  See Rust v Sullivan, supra not
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 The prohibition against political intervention also can be justified as a 
corollary of the meaning of public purpose.  Pursuit of a public purpose is not 
consistent with involvement in political campaigns, which is by definition partisan.  
The Service does not, for example, bar 501(c)(3) organizations from campaign 
activity that is nonpartisan, such as voter mobilization not favoring a specific political 
party or candidate.  Nor, as described above, does it prohibit other election related 
activities that are conducted on a nonpartisan basis.187  As explained by the IRS, in 
contrast to lobbying, which can be targeted to specific legislation of direct interest to 
an organization, “support of a candidate for public office necessarily involves the 
organization in the total political attitudes and positions of the candidate.”188 
 Clearly, some exempt organizations are convinced that they can further their 
exempt purpose more effectively by supporting or opposing particular candidates for 
public office than without such actions, and they may be correct in some instances.  
However, as long as Congress’s decision not to commit public funds to partisan 
methods of achieving public purposes bestows or withholds exemption in a politically 
neutral fashion, it would appear to meet the minimal requirements of the rational 
relation test without difficulty.   
  
  
 C. Vagueness and Overbreadth Analysis 
 
 The prohibition against political campaign activity could also be challenged as 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because neither the statute nor the regulations 
elaborate with precision the nature of the proscribed activity.189  The very general 
standards set forth in the statute and regulations are developed in a few judicial 
decisions, numerous Revenue Rulings, private letter rulings, and assorted other 
administrative pronouncements.  Of course, letter rulings and similar administrative 
materials are not precedential guidance, which might affect a First Amendment 
challenge based upon vagueness or overbreadth since they cannot be cited in a 
judicial proceeding as precedent.190  There is some authority that a court can consult 
191such materials for an indication of the IRS’s interpretation of a tax provision  and 
                                                                                                                                            
is page 8. 
analytical link” uniting 
 334 (2003), citing Hannover 
organization’s equal protection challenge on the ground that the substantial lobbying 
provision was part of Congress’s legitimate tax classification function).   
187  See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
188   Gen. Couns. Mem. 34233, Dec. 3, 1969, at Lex
189  See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.  For the “
vagueness and overbreadth analysis, see Kolender v Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358-359 
(1983), cited in Nationalist Movement v. Comm’r, supra note 24, at 585.  Nationalist 
Movement also cites LAWRENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-31 (2d ed. 1988) 
and Richard Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 903-907 (1991). 
190  See I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3); Treas. Reg. 601.201(l)(6). 
191  See Fla. Power & Light v. U.S., 56 Fed. Cl. 328,
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even “accept the reasoning” as persuasive in the absence of authority to the 
contrary.192  Nonetheless, the courts are agreed that taxpayers are not entitled to have 
a court resolve a controversy based upon views expressed by the Service to other 
taxpayers or contained in internal administrative documents.193 
 Efforts to determine whether legislation is unconstitutionally vague often 
forcement.   Initially, most of 
nvolving 
                  
begin with a general statement of  the public policies served by the vagueness 
standard.  First and foremost is the concern that, absent sufficient specificity, 
government directives will fail to afford adequate notice to those affected concerning 
conduct required or prohibited.  Frequently cited in this connection is the warning of 
Connally v. General Construction Co., that a criminal statute is unconstitutionally 
vague if “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application.”194  The opinion rested on the observation that due process 
presupposes that substantial fines and long terms of imprisonment may only be 
imposed if the nature of the proscribed conduct has been conveyed sufficiently to 
those potentially affected.195  Equally important is the 
concern that a vague statute lends itself to arbitrary en 196
the cases citing Connally, involved criminal statutes and  loyalty oaths.197 More 
recently, the Connally pronouncement has been cited in the context of civil laws 
challenged for being unconstitutionally vague.198  However, “where a statute imposes 
criminal penalties, the standard of certainty is higher” than in other cases.199 
 It is unclear how these authorities would be applied in tax cases i
First Amendment issues and what level of scrutiny would be employed in analyzing 
the political campaign prohibition employing a vagueness or overbreadth test. 
Taxation with Representation is not useful here, since the plaintiff association did not 
“challenge the proscription against ‘substantial lobbying’ on grounds of 
                                                                                                                          
Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672 (1962). 
192  See AT&T Corp. v. U.S., 63 Fed. Cl. 209, 213 (2004).  
193  See Fla. Power & Light, supra note 190, at 334. 
194  269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926), citing International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 
U.S. 216, 221 (1914), which invalidated a criminal antitrust statute, and Collins v. 
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914), which invalidated a criminal statute prohibiting 
members of certain agricultural pools from acting independently of the pool. 
195  Connally, supra note 194, at 390. 
196  Kolender, supra note 189, at 358; Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange 
County, 368 U.S. 278, 283 (1961) (invalidating a loyalty oath that was punishable by 
dismissal from public employment and conviction for perjury). 
197  See, e.g., supra note [183] and Speiser, supra note 89.   
198  See, e.g., Big Mama Rag, supra note 15, at 1035. 
199  Kolender, supra note 189 at 358 n.8 (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 
515 (1948)).  See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998) (observing that vagueness 
in a” criminal statute or regulatory scheme” could raise concerns not present when 
selecting recipients for publicly funded (NEA) grants). 
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vagueness.”200  In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, a public funding case 
decided in 1998, the Supreme Court upheld statutory criteria that had been challenged 
as both discriminatory and vague.201 In its decision, the Court distinguished the level 
of scrutiny required for criminal statutes and statutes that directly regulate conduct, on 
the one hand, and statutes involving subsidies, on the other.202  It held that “when the 
Government is acting as a patron rather than a sovereign,” a level of imprecision is 
permitted that would be constitutionally unacceptable in other contexts.203   
 The campaign prohibition in the Code is clearly not a criminal statute since the 
ost careful analyses of vagueness in a section 501(c)(3) context 
                                                
sanctions for violating it range from a warning letter204 or the imposition of an excise 
tax205 to revocation of tax exemption.206 Although tax statutes are not necessarily 
regulatory statutes, it would seem that the campaign prohibition could be 
characterized as regulatory since its purpose is to control behavior rather than raise 
revenue.  Alternatively, the prohibition can be seen as incidental to the statute’s 
primary purpose of defining what is charitable by excluding activities that are private 
and partisan in nature.207 So interpreted the prohibition is less regulatory than 
classificatory, and the classification serves the government’s interest in selecting as 
charities those nonprofits most worthy of public subsidy. The classification of the 
political prohibition as regulatory or not might well determine whether the challenge 
to it on vagueness grounds would be tested under a deferential standard or a form of 
heightened scrutiny. 
 One of the m
occurs in Big Mama Rag v. United States.208  The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit characterized the standard to be applied in First Amendment cases 
as “strict,”209 and it concluded that the definition of “educational” in the Treasury 
regulations was unconstitutionally vague and prone to selective enforcement.210  The 
court found that the regulations’ “full and fair” standard was not only too general to 
be informative; it noted as well that the regulations’ reliance on “the reactions of 
 
200  See Taxation with Representation of Washington v. Regan, 676 F2d 715, 726 n.22 
(D.C. Cir. 1982). 
201  See NEA v. Finley, supra note 199 (upholding admittedly vague and subjective 
standards for selecting recipients for NEA awards). 
202  See NEA v. Finley, supra note 199, at 567-88. 
203  See NEA v. Finley, supra note 199, at 588-89.    
204  See IRS, FINAL REPORT, PROJECT 302, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE 
INITIATIVE (“PACI”).  The Service found that 68 percent of the charities it investigated 
had in fact violated the political prohibition.  Almost all these groups were issued 
“written advisories.” 
205  See I.R.C. § 4955. 
206  See  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(I), (iii). 
207  See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.  
208  Supra note 15. 
209  Big Mama Rag, supra note 15, at 1035.   
210  See Big Mama Rag, supra note 15, at 1037. 
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members of the public” insured that the test would employ a “necessarily varying and 
unascertainable standard.”211 Moreover, the applicable regulations were so confusing 
that it was unclear to the court whether the organization in question should have been 
subjected to the standard in the first place.212 The standard thus invited “subjective 
definitions.”213 And in fact, the court observed, these ambiguities had enabled the 
Service to apply the “full and fair” test to “only a very few organizations, whose 
views are not in the mainstream of political thought.”214 In particular, the IRS 
appeared to have applied its test to a homosexual organization inappropriately,215 and 
the association involved in Big Mama Rag characterized itself as feminist and 
lesbian.216   
 It seems, then, that the sub-text of the vagueness discussion in Big Mama Rag 
                                                
was the court’s concern that the IRS was using the regulations’ malleable standards to 
suppress certain kinds of ideas it found distasteful or contrary to public policy.217  
This possibility is reinforced by the fact that, in developing its view of the strict 
standard to be applied to vagueness challenges in the First Amendment area, the Big 
Mama Rag court relied on cases that involved content discrimination and the 
suppression of viewpoints.218  That the Big Mama Rag outcome was driven by the 
court’s response to the Service’s practice of disfavoring views with which it did not 
agree substantively was also the interpretation of Big Mama Rag adopted by the Tax 
Court in a subsequent case that upheld the constitutionality of Revenue Procedure 86-
43,219 the ruling promulgated by the Service to supplement the definition of 
“education” in its regulations after they were declared unconstitutionally vague in Big 
Mama Rag.220  
 
211  Big Mama Rag, supra note 15, at 1037. 
7.  
7. 
 also id. at 1040 (referring to the lower 
tates, 494 F. 
stitutional to deny 501(c)(3) exemption to a group that violates 
Comm’r, supra note 24, at 581-83.  Rev. Proc. 86-43 
212  Big Mama Rag, supra note 15, at 1036-3
213  Big Mama Rag, supra note 15, at 1035. 
214  Big Mama Rag, supra note 15, at 1036-3
215  Big Mama Rag, supra note 15, at 1035.  See
court’s “value laden conclusion that Big Mama Rag was too doctrinaire”). 
216  Big Mama Rag, supra note 15, at 1032; Big Mama Rag v. United S
Supp. 473, 480 (1979). 
217  Of course, it is con
a strong public policy.  See Bob Jones University v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574 (1983) 
(upholding the Service’s denial of a charitable exemption to an institution of higher 
learning that discriminated in admissions on the basis of race).  
218  See Big Mama Rag, supra note 15, at 1035.   
219  1986-2 CUM. BULL. 729.  
220  See Nationalist Movement v. 
was before the District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit in National Alliance 
v. United States, 710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  The court in that case declined to rule 
directly on the constitutionality of the Revenue Procedure, but it did note (in dictum) 
that the four-part test went a long way toward “reducing” the vagueness in the “full and 
fair” test.  Id. at 875.  
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 Clearly, on its face, the political campaign prohibition is not designed to 
suppress specific viewpoints since it is not targeted to any political party or political 
orientation.  However, it is possible to view the standard as not precise enough  to 
afford notice to taxpayers attempting to comply with its strictures nor to prevent 
arbitrary, viewpoint based enforcement.  Opinions are likely to differ as to the 
existence of political bias on the part of the IRS when it actually enforces the political 
prohibition.  Complaints alleging biased enforcement have in fact been leveled against 
the agency.221 Responding to such complaints, the Treasury Inspector General of Tax 
Administration (TIGTA) conducted an investigation and gave the IRS a clean bill of 
health in 2005.222 In addition, since 2004, the IRS has established a national, 
standardized procedure for identifying and reviewing possible violations of the 
political prohibition in each election cycle.  This procedure is known as the “Political 
Activities Compliance Initiative,” or “PACI.”223  The method employed, which is 
published on the IRS website, involves a specially trained team of personnel that 
reviews all of the referrals, decides which cases should be investigated, forwards them 
to designated agents in the field for investigation, and recommends sanctions when 
violations are found.224  Although these procedures do not guarantee lack of bias, the 
process should reduce the opportunity for viewpoint discrimination significantly 
because it is well documented and transparent. 
 Even if the IRS procedure is not seen to pose a substantial threat of bias, it is 
nonetheless possible that vagueness and overbreadth claims against the political 
                                                 
221  See, e.g., Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 19 (D.D.C. 1999); 
Donald B. Tobin, The Law of Politics: The Role of Law in Advancing Democracy: 
Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, 
Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1315-16 (2007). Art Pine, Inquiry Finds 
No IRS Wrongdoing in Audits; Taxation Congressional Panel Finds No Evidence that 
Conservative Groups Were Purposely Targeted.  An Improper Inquiry by Gore’s Office 
Cited, Los Angeles Times, Mar. 16, 2000, at A16.  See also infra note 222 and 
accompanying text. 
222   See Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Review of the Exempt 
Organizations Function Process for Reviewing Alleged Political Campaign 
Intervention by Tax Exempt Organizations (February 2005,Reference Number: 2005-
10-035).  See also Pine, supra note 221.  
223  See IRS, Final Report, Project 302, Political Activities Compliance Initiative 
(hereinafter “2004 PACI”) (discussing the method used to identify, review, and, where 
appropriate, sanction 501(c)(3) groups possibly engaging in prohibited activity in the 
2004 election); IRS, 2006 Political Activities Compliance Initiative.  The PACI review 
for the 2008 election cycle is still in progress.  For the reports issued in connection with 
the 2004 and 2006 election cycles and materials related to the 2008 review, see 
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=179738,00.html.  See also infra 
note 224. 
224  See, IRS, Political Activities Compliance Initiative; Procedures for 501(c)(3) 
Organizations, at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/paci_procedures_feb_22_2006.pdf.; 
2004 PACI, supra note 223. 
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prohibition would be examined using more than the rational relation test, since the 
nature of these claims can be conceptually distinguished from the existence of a 
subsidy.225 In that event, the extent of the prohibition’s vagueness or overbreadth is 
likely to influence, if not determine, whether a court would subject the prohibition to 
heightened scrutiny. The notice provided to organizations and guidance available to 
enforcement personnel in connection with the political prohibition can in no way be 
compared with the vagueness of the standards at issue in Big Mama Rag in at least 
two respects.  First, the difference between the regulations in the two situations is 
especially clear with respect to the extent of vagueness or overbreadth. In Big Mama 
Rag, it was not even obvious to the court which organizations were subject to the “full 
and fair” test to begin with, in addition to the fact that there was no written guidance 
elaborating the meaning of “full and fair” once applied.226  In contrast, there are more 
than a dozen Revenue Rulings addressing the meaning of the political prohibition, 
many of which describe and analyze multiple fact patterns,227 as well as a few judicial 
decisions.228  Although the prohibition is enforced through a facts and circumstances 
test, there is thus a significant amount of precedential guidance to assist both 
organizations that seek to stay on the right side of the line and IRS personnel seeking 
to enforce the standard properly.229  The information contained in these sources has 
been reproduced in plain language guides in a wide assortment of pamphlets, 
brochures, and memoranda produced by law firms and advocacy organizations, many 
of which are available for free on the internet.230  That the amount of guidance 
                                                 
225  Vagueness/overbreadth claims are, however, related to the subsidy issue since, but 
d accompanying texts; Kindell & Reilly, 
choes Nat’l 
on-precedential guidance in the form of private letter 
re a series of advisories produced by the Alliance for 
for the desire to acquire or retain a subsidy, there would be no tax law consequence for 
misinterpreting the reach of the political prohibition. 
226  See Big Mama Rag, supra note 212. 
227  See supra notes 29, 32, 39-41an
supra note 28.  A large part of this guidance was issued in the last decade. 
228  See supra notes 14, 26, 32, and accompanying text and Christian E
Ministry, Inc. V U.S., 470 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 
(1973).  See also American Campaign Academy v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 153 (1989); 
Kindell & Reilly, supra note 28. 
229  There is also considerable n
rulings issued to individual taxpayers, IRS Fact Sheets, Field Service advisories, PACI 
reports, and Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional Education (CPE) Technical 
Instruction Program essays used for training IRS personnel. All of these materials are 
available on Lexis and Westlaw. 
230  Some illustrative examples a
Justice (AJF), located in Washington, D.C., and available at http://www.afj.org/for-
nonprofits-foundations/resources-and-publications/about-advocacy-election.html; 
National Council for Nonprofits, available at 
http://www.councilofnonprofits.org/elections#IRS; OMB Watch, available at 
http://www.ombwatch.org/node/9627; James Bopp, Jr., Guidelines for Political 
Activities for Churches and Pastors, available at 
http://www.mccl.org/Document.Doc?id=177; James Bopp, Jr., Guidelines for Political 
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explaining the political prohibition is “significant” does not mean it is optimal. 
Optimal would be detailed regulations, replete with illustrations, as exist to determine 
what constitutes lobbying when a section 501(h) election is in effect.231 Yet, given the 
complexity and variety of methods of campaign activity, this may well be a situation 
in which the constitutional protection afforded speech must take into account 
“whether it would have been practical to draft more precisely.”232 
 Second, as important as the quantity of guidance for interpreting the political 
prohibition is the fact that the criteria contained in the guidance are largely objective.  
For example, the Service’s determination depends upon such things as whether voting 
records are distributed on an annual basis at the close of legislative sessions or their 
distribution is timed to an election, whether communications about legislative issues 
are targeted to election periods and concentrated in swing states where those issues 
are identified with specific candidates, whether all candidates are invited to candidate 
forums, whether voter guides based upon candidate surveys reproduce the candidates’ 
words accurately, whether partisan voter guides are distributed on the organization’s 
premises or on the public sidewalks outside their control, and the like.233  This 
contrasts with Big Mama Rag, where the standard in the regulations required the IRS 
to determine if a newsletter’s articles were “full and fair” “based upon an 
individualistic–and therefore necessarily varying and unascertainable–standard the 
reactions of members of the public.”234  Importantly, in contrast to the situation in Big 
Mama Rag,235 the political prohibition is not ambiguous at all about the entities 
covered by its strictures.   
 Some of the criteria contained in the political prohibition are, however, 
subjective.  For example, depending upon the context, the IRS will examine whether 
the format or questions at a candidate forum reveal bias, whether the questions asked 
in a candidate survey are too concentrated in a single subject area, suggesting bias, or 
whether a communication made on the eve of an election improperly conveys a view 
as to a candidate’s fitness for office.  Considerations such as these inject an element of 
uncertainty into the analysis that is troubling from a First Amendment perspective 
because, as a practical matter, they may impose a burden of restraint on would-be 
actors during an election who desire to engage in political speech or other election 
related activities.  The presence of such subjective criteria in such an important area 
                                                                                                                                            
Activities of Right to Life Organizations (May 2008), at 
http://www.paprolife.org/2008%20Guidelines%20for%20Right%20to%20Life%20Org
anizations.pdf. 
231  See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-1 to -7. 
232  Nationalist Movement v. Commissioner, supra note 24, at 588 (1994) (citing 
United States Civil Serv. Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 
U.S. 548, 578-579 (1973)). 
233  See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
234  Big Mama Rag, supra note 15, at 1037. 
235  See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
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of constitutional law might trigger the application of heightened scrutiny to the 
potential vagueness and associated overbreadth of the political prohibition.  
 The fact that the political prohibition does not discriminate on the basis of 
ewpo
lations of the political prohibition are not usually subject to criminal 
vi int and that the scope of the standard is not open-ended, as were the 
regulations implicated in Big Mama Rag, suggests that the prohibition would be 
subject to intermediate scrutiny, if the rational relation test is deemed too lenient for 
the vagueness and overbreadth threat to political speech. That intermediate scrutiny 
would be used, rather than strict scrutiny, if heightened scrutiny is employed, is also 
suggested by the circumstance that most of the campaign finance cases employing 
strict scrutiny involved criminal sanctions.  For example, in invalidating the political 
expenditure cap in Buckley, the Supreme Court noted that “[c]lose examination of the 
specificity of the statutory limitation [on independent expenditures] is required where, 
as here, the legislation imposes criminal penalties in an area permeated by First 
Amendment interests.”236 The Court characterized vagueness in statutes with criminal 
sanctions as “particularly treacherous.”237 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Wisconsin 
Right to Life was similarly concerned that the penalty for violating the law was 
criminal prosecution and criminal penalties.238 Likewise, for the Citizens United 
majority, the “threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending against 
FEC enforcement” facing corporations seeking to engage in political activity during 
elections made the source rules in FECA analogous to prior restraints on protected 
speech.239 
 Vio
sanctions. In the worst case, the IRS could impose revocation of an organization’s 
exemption and a civil tax penalty.240  For a 501(c)(3) group, an excise tax of ten 
percent of the amount spent on communication(s) determined to be campaign 
intervention could be imposed on the organization, and a 2 ½ percent tax could be 
imposed on the managers who made the decision, unless their action was not willful 
and was due to reasonable cause.241 As the IRS’s recent enforcement push reveals, 
                                                 
236  Buckley., supra note 34, at 40-41.  See also id. at 41 n.47 and supra note 225. 
8, 468, 493 (127 S. Ct. at 2666, 2666, 2680).  See 
ote 13, at *43-*44. 
classified as for-profit and owe back 
955(a).  Under existing interpretation of willfulness and reasonable 
237  Buckley., supra note 34, at 76. 
238  See WRTL, supra note 11, at 46
also McConnell, supra note 39, at 323, 330 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). 
239  Citizens United, supra n
240  A 501(c)(4) organization would then be re
taxes and interest. 
241  See I.R.C. § 4
cause, it is unlikely that many decision makers would be subject o the manager’s tax.  
See the description of the sanctions imposed so far on violations occurring in the last 
three election cycles in the PACI reports, supra note 223.  Note, however, that the 
amount of the excise taxes can be doubled to 100 percent and 50 percent, for the 
organization and managers respectively, if the violation is not corrected.  See id. § 
4955(b).  Correction means “recovering part or all of the expenditure to the extent 
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however, revocation is rarely proposed and it has only been imposed if violations are 
flagrant or repeated.242  As the PACI Reports also reveal, most organizations found to 
have engaged in prohibited campaign activity have received only written advisories, 
even though the violation included such clearly prohibited activities as contributing 
money to a candidate or posting campaign signs on the organization’s premises.243  
Even when excise taxes have been imposed, the Service frequently refunds the tax as 
well as interest and penalties, if any, if the organization corrects the violation.244 
Further, revocation relating to one or more years of an organization in no way 
precludes it from having its exemption restored in exchange for agreeing to abstain 
from campaign activities.  All of these considerations bear on how chilled an 
organization’s speech is likely to be as a result of the political prohibition.  Although 
civil fines can impose burdens on the affected entities, the burden is qualitatively 
different from and usually far less extreme than what is entailed by criminal sanctions.  
 Under the intermediate scrutiny standard of judicial scrutiny, Congress would 
have to demonstrate that the purpose of the political prohibition “furthers an 
important or substantial” interest, is “unrelated to the suppression of free expression,” 
and needs the prohibition for its goal to be implemented “effectively.”245  All of the 
interests furthered by the political prohibition should be considered substantial: 
preventing deductible charitable contributions from being used to fund political 
activities, assuring that only organizations devoted exclusively to a charitable mission 
are selected to benefit from public funding, preventing tax favored charities from 
dissipating their time, energy, and concentration on partisan activities, and preventing 
charities from engaging in activities with a high risk of furthering the private benefit 
of individuals and candidates for public office. 
 The means chosen by Congress to address these concerns may be more 
controversial.  As was noted earlier, if preventing public funds from subsidizing 
campaign activity is seen as the sole government interest, it may be possible to 
construct a mechanism involving an affiliated entity to reduce this risk.246  Even so, it 
is difficult to predict whether the political prohibition would be found constitutionally 
                                                                                                                                            
recovery is possible, establishment of safeguards to prevent future political 
expenditures, and where full recovery is not possible, such additional corrective action 
as is prescribed by the Secretary by regulations.”  Id. 4955(f)(3). 
242  See 2004 and 2006 PACI reports, supra note 223; Branch Ministries, supra note 
15 (revoking the exemption of a church that had placed a full-page advertisement in 
two national newspapers urging Christians not to vote for Bill Clinton for President). 
243    See supra note 223. 
244  See Catholic Answers, supra note 15, at *7-*8 (Lexis pages); Complaint, Christian 
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infirm for this reason, given that intermediate scrutiny does not require government to 
select the least restrictive means to achieving a statute’s purpose.  Further, taking into 
account considerations such as keeping charities’ focus on their charitable mission 
and out of partisan activities, the ability of a 501(c)(3) organizations to partner with 
affilated 501(c)(4) groups that engage in campaign activity could well satisfy the 
standard of being narrowly drawn to achieve the entire range of statutory purposes.    
 
 CONCLUSION 
The preceding analysis is inconclusive.  A direct attack on the constitutionality 
ueness or overbreadth challenge to the terms 
utional tax law 
                                                
 
 
of the tax law prohibition on 501(c)(3) groups’ political campaign activity is unlikely 
to succeed, even though the tax law restriction applies to a far wider range of 
campaign activities than is permitted for campaign finance law.247  The key 
differences in the constitutional analysis of the prohibition under tax law, as compared 
with the counterpart analysis of restrictions on political speech under campaign 
finance law, suggest that minimal judicial scrutiny will be applied to the former and 
that both the government’s purpose in limiting political activity for charities and the 
means chosen will be found reasonable. 
 The outcome with respect to a vag
of the prohibition, as implemented by the IRS and the courts, is more uncertain.  
Among other reasons, there is the possibility that intermediate scrutiny would be 
employed rather than the rational relation test.  Even in that event, it is likely that 
some, if not all, of the government interests discussed in Part IV would be considered 
substantial.  In contrast, there is some uncertainty as to the ability of the political 
prohibition to qualify as narrowly enough drawn to achieve the statute’s purpose.  In 
particular, the prohibition’s validity in this respect may turn on whether a reviewing 
court accepts the validity of linking the prohibition to goals other than preventing 
deductible charitable contributions from financing campaign activity.   
 I would distinguish what I believe is a fair reading of the constit
jurisprudence and what might happen if the political campaign prohibition makes its 
way to the Supreme Court.  Five of the current Justices have made crystal clear their 
aversion to anything that purports to interfere with the free exercise of political 
speech.  It is possible that they could disregard the weight of the precedents described 
in this paper, invoking other entrenched constitutional doctrines, for example, that the 
government should not be permitted to do indirectly what it cannot do directly.  They 
might argue that Massachusetts Citizens for Life has superseded Taxation with 
Representation, relegating the distinction expressly made by the Supreme Court in 
 
247  This Article has confined itself to the constitutional dimensions of the political 
prohibition.  For a thorough analysis of the public policy reasons for the prohibition, 
focusing on the dangers that would result were 501©)(3) groups to engage in 
campaign activity, see Tobin, supra note 221. 
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that case235 to mere dictum in a footnote. In that event, the alternate channel doctrine 
blessed in Taxation with Representation would no longer be good law, and exempt 
organizations, like organizations in general, could not have their political speech 
regulated to a greater degree than is permitted by Buckley, as interpreted by Wisconsin 
Right to Life and Citizens United.  As remote as that possibility may seem, taking into 
account that three Justices are already on record as prepared to overrule Buckley 
altogether,236 uncertainty in this area is all that is really certain.   
 
                                                 
235  See supra notes 163-164.  
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